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RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF SECTION
8(B)(1)(A)-1947-1997: AN ESSAY ON
COLLECTIVE EMPOWERMENT AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD
Roger C. Hartley*
I am confident that history will record the Taft-Hartley Act
as a great forward step in labor relations law. I am proud.., of
the part I played in its development and enactment.**
From its enactment over President Truman's veto, and for many years
thereafter, the debate surrounding the Taft-Hartley Act was sharp but
relatively contained. Partisan energy focused on whether one should
celebrate the balance Taft-Hartley returned (brought) to labor law or
whether to lament its bias, its antiunion roots, and its invasion of work-
ers' fundamental right to self-organization.
Today, the debate has decidedly shifted. Criticism of the New Deal la-
bor relations system itself has become ubiquitous. On the right, the
Wagner Act is seen as a "massive 'pro-labor' invention" that needs to be
repealed because it grants unions the power to coerce both employees
and employers into involuntary associations with unions.1 On the left,
the assessments are, if anything, even less generous: that the Wagner Act
provides workers a "counterfeit liberty," merely the "opportunity to par-
ticipate in the construction of their own subordination."' To be sure,
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** FRED A. HARTLEY, JR., OUR NEW NATIONAL LABOR POLICY: THE TAFT-
HARTLEY ACT AND THE NEXT STEPS 138 (1948). There is no known familial relationship
between Congressman Hartley and the author of this essay.
1. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Free Ron Carey! Repeal the Wagner Act!, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 14, 1997, at A23.
2. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 326-28
(1985); see also JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAW 42-43 (1983) (discussing one view of the New Deal as representing "a series of
stratagems designed to strengthen and revitalize American capitalism"); Karl E. Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Conscious-
ness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268-70 (1978) (discussing how judicial interpreta-
tion of labor law channels industrial conflict in ways that repress workers' aspirations for
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there remains a solid moderate core. Most workers' advocates can so be
situated. They emphasize the "unprecedented protection" the Wagner
Act has provided workers and warn that its contributions should not be
dismissed too hastily.3 But even critics supportive of labor law's contri-
bution to the social good warn that the Act is badly in need of reform, for
without reform, collapse of the collective bargaining system is a real pos-
sibility within the coming decade.'
In short, across the political and ideological spectrum, the question in-
creasingly being asked is whether the New Deal labor relations system,
of which Taft-Hartley is an integral part, can be made to serve the inter-
ests of management, unions, workers, and the public interest as we enter
the post-industrial twenty-first century? The academic and professional
journals overflow with remedial suggestions. Yet nothing happens as
equality); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1544-45 (1981) (stating that the theory of "joint sovereignty," the
foundation of postwar labor law policy, is illusory).
3. Craig Becker, Individual Rights and Collective Action: The Legal History of Trade
Unions in America, 100 HARv. L. REV. 672, 684, 687 (1987) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L.
TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE
ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985)) (stating that "[t]he
Wagner Act was of signal importance to the labor movement, notwithstanding . . . ex-
tended argument[s] to the contrary, for it gave workers ground to contest the arbitrary
power exercised by both government and employers against unions and labor organiz-
ers"); Russell Hollander, Book Review, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 421, 440 (1994) (re-
viewing WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991)) (arguing that the author's "zeal to demonstrate that the courts played
a dominant and motivating role in Labor's decision to abandon legislative reform in favor
of private action ... mistakenly assumes that the American working class has suffered as a
result").
4. William Gould, currently the chair of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), has been referred to as "an utterly mainstream, accomplished, 'establishment'
labor law professor." Joel Rogers, U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 100-01
n.9 (1993). Gould has argued, for example, that the current system needs reform if we are
to reverse the erosion of worker dignity and job security and provide for the continuing
efficacy of the collective bargaining process. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR
REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 9 (1993);
Rogers, supra, at 100-01 n.9. Others, also fairly situated in the "mainstream," have
sounded the alarm that the "the NLRA has become an antiquated and relatively mean-
ingless statute." Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inade-
quacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1616, 1643 (1995)
(reviewing WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW (1993)); see also Rogers, supra, at 97
(noting that while the New Deal system of labor law "may have been well-suited to the
industrial society of the 1930s-1950s [it has failed because it] has not adjusted to the 'new
economic realities' of the 1990s").
5. The quest for answers has become so overwhelming during the past 15 years that
one author has offered that today "[i]t is almost quaint to search for causes explaining the
steep decline in the fortunes of the American labor movement at the close of the twentieth
century." Christopher D. Cameron, How the "Language of the Law" Limited the Ameri-
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the union density rate among private sector nonagricultural employees
continues to slip. It now teeters at 10.2% with responsible estimates
warning that it could drop to 7%.6 There are even respectable estimates
of a drop to 5% by the end of the century.
7
The Taft-Hartley section 8(b)(1)(A) s union discipline cases are linked
to the impending collapse of collective bargaining in two ways. At one
level, they have helped cause it by denying union majorities an important
tool to enforce solidarity during economic disputes with employers and
thereby have contributed to the loss of worker empowerment. At an-
other level, the union discipline cases reflect certain shifts in national
sentiments with respect to the role of unions and collective bargaining in
general and the accommodation of collective bargaining to the compet-
ing claims of individuals and employers in particular. This paper is about
both linkages.
I. THE TRANSFER OF BARGAINING POWER THROUGH NLRB
REGULATION OF UNION DISCIPLINE
Labor policy incorporates the well-recognized tension between an em-
ployee group's right to choose an exclusive bargaining representative and
the individual's right to refrain from participation in the group.9 Thus,
can Labor Movement, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1992) (reviewing WILLIAM E.
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991)). For
a summary by the most recent blue ribbon presidential commission assembled to look into
these questions, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT FINDING
REPORT: COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 1-27
(1994) (Dunlop Commission Report).
6. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 632 n.232 (1992) (citing the work of Leo Troy).
7. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Pre-
serve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 397, 400 (1992) (citing Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 241, at A-1 (Dec. 18, 1989)); see also Rogers, supra note 4, at 100 n.6 (stating
that the "United States now approximates the 'union free' environment favored by profes-
sional anti-unionists [and] on a continuation of current trends [union density] should fall
to about 5 percent by the end of the decade").
8. 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(1)(A) (1994). This section provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sec-
tion 157 of this title: Provided That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or re-
tention of membership therein.
Id.
9. See id. § 157. Section 157 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for... mutual aid or protec-
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when a union membership majority disciplines an offending member for
violating a union rule, the question arises whether this violates section
8(b)(1)(A) of Taft-Hartley.
A. The Modest Origins of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
Section 8(b)(1)(A)'s legislative history demonstrates the section was
added as a floor amendment by a small group in the Senate to quell cer-
tain union organizing tactics-particularly "physical violence and intimi-
dation, including mass picketing in connection with an organizational
strike." 10 This was the conclusion of Professor Archibald Cox in his in-
fluential 1947 article entitled Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947."
Section 8(b)(1)(A)'s legislative history surely supports Professor Cox's
conclusion that it was designed to outlaw certain union conduct em-
ployed to recruit new members and to quell violence against persons
wishing to cross a union picket line to work. It was not enacted to regu-
late union internal affairs. The account of the section's legislative history
has been told elsewhere and well." A short version is added here, as
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities.
Id.
10. Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1947) (Part One) [hereinafter Cox, Part One]; Archibald Cox, Some
Aspects Of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 292 (1947)
(Part Two) [hereinafter Cox, Part Tw6].
11. See Cox, Part One, supra note 10, at 1; Cox, Part Two, supra note 10, at 274.
Professor Cox predicted that "Section 8(b)(1) may plunge the Board into a dismal swamp
of uncertainty." Cox, Part One, supra note 10, at 33. Many have cited this forecast. See
Kevin C. Marcoux, Comment, Section 8(b)(1)(A) from Allis-Chalmers to Pattern Makers'
League: A Case Study in Judicial Legislation, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1411 n.8 (1986) (col-
lecting authority). The uncertainty Professor Cox observed in section 8(b)(1)(A)'s legisla-
tive history needs to be understood. The section's Senate sponsors expressed varying
opinions regarding which union organizing tactics needed legal control. It was these dif-
ferences of opinion that Professor Cox believed threatened to create a "dismal swamp of
uncertainty" for the NLRB. Because the new section "follows the familiar phraseology of
Section 8(a)(1)" and because "its sponsors repeatedly explained that the new section
would make it unfair for labor organizations to engage in activities which were unfair
when engaged in by employers," Professor Cox argued that the full intent of the sponsors
was unclear regarding which organizing tactics were now to be unlawful. Cox, Part One,
supra note 10, at 30-31 & n.126 (citing legislative history). As Professor Cox stated, "[i]ts
vagueness alone, not to mention the broad interpretations put upon it during the debates
in Congress, encourages the filing of great numbers of charges as weapons in fighting the
unionization of a plant." Id. at 33 (emphasis added). Of particular concern were refer-
ences in the legislative history that union promises or false statements made during an or-
ganizing campaign might be found to violate the new section. It was only in this respect
that the sponsors were unclear regarding section 8(b)(1)(A)'s sweep. See id. at 32-33.
12. See Marcoux, supra note 11, at 1411-15 & n.8 (collecting authority); cf. James B.
Atleson, Union Fines and Picket Lines: The NLRA and Union Disciplinary Power, 17
[Vol. 47:825
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Appendix A to this essay, for those who may be unfamiliar with it or
wish to refresh their recollection.
B. Judicial and Administrative Abstinence Until 1964
During the first seventeen years following the enactment of section
8(b)(1)(A), the NLRB adhered to the limits its sponsors had conceded so
readily and often. In 1948, the Labor Board applied the section to curb
union violence against certain persons wishing to cross a union picket
line established as part of a union economic strike. 3 In 1949, in Interna-
tional Typographical Union (American Newspaper Publishers)," the
NLRB reviewed that legislative history in a case posing the issue of
whether a union violates section 8(b)(1)(A) by threatening members
with summary expulsion for refusing to engage in behavior violative of
the duty of good faith bargaining. 5 Agreeing that the section created no
governmental authority to invade the internal affairs of unions, the
Board stated that "Congress unmistakenly intended to, and did, remove
the application of a union's membership rules to its members from the
proscriptions of Section 8(b)(1)(A), irrespective of any ulterior reasons
motivating the union's application of such rules or the direct effect thereof
on particular employees."'6 Many other NLRB cases decided during the
decade following 1947 acknowledged the unions' freedom of self-
regulation to expel, even when expulsion threatened important labor
policies.17 So clear were the NLRB's decisions in this regard that in 1954,
the NLRB General Counsel refused even to issue a complaint in a case
involving a union suspension of several members for filing unfair labor
practice charges against the union and the employer. The Board's Gen-
UCLA L. REV. 681, 711 (1970) (arguing that "confident reliance on ... [section
8(b)(1)(A)'s] legislative history is not warranted for any position").
13. See International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (Sonset Line and
Twine Co.) 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1516 (1948).
14. 86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949), enforced, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), affd on other
grounds, 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
15. See id. at 956-57.
16. Id. at 957 (emphasis added). In American Newspaper Publishers, the Board used
the cited text to explain its 1948 decision in National Maritime Union (The Texas Co.) 78
N.L.R.B. 971, 982 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949) (finding no section
8(b)(1)(A) violation to attempt, through collective bargaining, to obtain an unlawful
closed shop agreement).
17. One commentator, reviewing those early cases, has concluded that they demon-
strate the NLRB's recognition "that use of section 8(b)(1)(A) as a free-floating mecha-
nism to enforce other policy concerns reflected in the Act is inappropriate .... [These
cases permit] a union ... to cause its members to violate a collective bargaining agree-
ment, respect an illegal secondary picket line, or respect the illegal picket line of another
union." Marcoux, supra note 11, at 1417-19 & nn.33, 37 (collecting cases).
19981
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eral Counsel reasoned that the "Act permits [a] union to take any action
it desires respecting acquisition or retention of membership.
18
As recently as 1964, the NLRB held to the view that section
8(b)(1)(A) made "unlawful the use of force, violence, physical obstruc-
tion, or threats thereof to accomplish certain purposes associated with
organizational activity and strikes."' 9 As the Board concluded in up-
holding a union's right to enforce fines judicially against members who
exceeded a union-imposed production quota, whatever else section
8(b)(1)(A) may prohibit, "internal union disciplines were not among the
restraints to be encompassed by the section."2
During this period, the Supreme Court in two cases, found that non-
violent union organizing tactics violated section 8(b)(1)(A).2' Both
turned on legislative history demonstrating a congressional intent "to
impose upon unions the same restrictions which the Wagner Act im-
posed on employers with respect to violations of employee rights. '22 But
as the Court subsequently explained in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing Co.:
However apposite this parallel might be when applied to or-
ganizational tactics, it clearly is inapplicable to the relationship
of a union member to his own union. Union membership al-
lows the member a part in choosing the very course of action to
which he refuses to adhere, but he has of course no role in em-
ployer conduct, and nonunion employees have no voice in the
affairs of the union.23
In NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639,24 the
Court concluded that section 8(b)(1)(A) "is a grant of power to the
18. Case No. 1059, Admin. Rulings of the NLRB Gen. Counsel, 35 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1167, 1167 (1954). The charges arose out of an agreement between the union and em-
ployer resulting in some employees being assigned undesirable job duties. See Marcoux,
supra note 11, at 1417-18.
19. Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1100 (1964), en-
forced, sub nom. Scofield v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968), affd, 394 U.S. 423 (1969);
see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 729 (1954) (finding that a non-
judicially enforced $500 fine for refusing to perform picket duty did not violate section
8(b)(1)(A) because "[slection 8(b)(1)(A) precludes any such interference with the internal
affairs of a labor organization").
20. Local283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. at 1100.
21. See ILGWU v. NLRB, (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 733
(1961); Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 501
(1954).
22. ILGWU, 366 U.S. at 738; see also Capital Serv., 204 F.2d at 852.
23. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 190-91 (1967).
24. 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
[Vol. 47:825
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Board limited to authority to proceed against union tactics involving
violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof-conduct involving
more than the general pressures upon persons employed by the affected
employers implicit in economic strikes."25 And just days prior to the
twentieth anniversary of the section's enactment, the plurality opinion in
Allis-Chalmers concluded that "the repeated refrain throughout the de-
bates on [section] 8(b)(1)(A) and other sections [was] that Congress did
not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions,
aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect
a member's employment status.,
6
C. Section 8(b) (1) (A)'s Transformation
By the late 1960s, national labor policy shifted to a very different view
of government's role, in several cases rejecting a literalist approach to
section 8(b)(1)(A)" NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuild-
ing Worker? was an expulsion case-not a fine case. The Court inter-
preted its previous decision in Allis-Chalmers as "assur[ing] a union free-
dom of self-regulation where its legitimate internal affairs are
concerned., 29 The next term, in Scofield v. NLRB," the Court upheld the
discipline but reasoned that proper analysis entails considering the object
of the rule, not just the means of its enforcement, so that it neither "in-
vades nor frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws."3
25. Id. at 290; see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694,
701-03 (1951) (stating that "[t]he words 'induce or encourage' [in section 8(b)(1)(A) are a]
'restricted phrase' amount[ing] to a 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit"').
26. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S. at 195.
27. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine
& Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
28. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
29. Id. at 424 (emphasis added). In Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, the Court held
that a union may not expel a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB prior to exhausting internal union procedures. See id. at 421, 426. By 1968, the
Board's view on this question was clear: a union may not discipline a member for failing to
exhaust internal union appeal procedures prior to filing an unfair labor practice charge-
whether by fine or expulsion. See Cannery Workers Union (Van Camp Sea Food Co.,
Inc.), 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 845 (1966), enforced, 396 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1968) (expulsion);
Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 682 (1964) (fines). Relying
on neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history, but without abandoning any of its
previous holdings or rationalizations in prior cases, the Board simply held that the
freedom of self-regulation assured to unions by section 8(b)(1)(A) is trumped if discipline
"run[s] counter to other recognized public policies .... Id.
30. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
31. Id. at 429. The Court then added, in dicta, additional limitations that had not
previously received prominence in its union discipline cases: whether the rule was (1)
1998]
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In retrospect, it seems clear that some government activism in over-
seeing the purposes of union discipline was probably inevitable. First, in
1947, Congress assured employees the right to refrain from union activi-
ties and prohibited union actions restraining that right. Moreover, once
the Court in Allis-Chalmers endorsed the NLRB's view that unions may
nevertheless participate in the government's coercive power by enforcing
its fines judicially, much of the game was over: government really had no
choice but to oversee the reasons for the discipline it was being asked to
enforce. In addition, notwithstanding the literal privilege given unions in
the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso to establish their own rules for the "acqui-
sition or retention of union membership," it was unrealistic to expect that
the NLRB and the Court would stand by silently if unions expelled
members for ieasons highly prejudicial to national labor policy. As early
as 1964, Board Member Leedom had filed a dissenting opinion in which
he expressed that view. Labor law, he argued, should not give unions a
green light to discipline members for testifying at an NLRB hearing,
"filing a decertification petition,... refusing to give the union a copy of
any statement made to a Board agent .... giving a statement to a Board
agent without the union's approval,.., refusing to participate in unlawful
union activity,... working with [black] employees,... [or] filing a griev-
ance not approved by the union [laws] .... ,32
By 1969, after Scofield, the NLRB and the Court, without the benefit
of a legislative amendment of section 8(b)(1)(A), had rearranged Ameri-
can labor policy to limit the union majority's authority to quell disloyalty
within its ranks. With the upgrade of section 8(b)(1)(A) came a promo-
tion for the NLRB. The Board now would be a major player whose most
important task would be determining whether union discipline "invades
or frustrates... overriding" labor policies.
properly adopted; (2) reasonably enforced; and (3) enforced only "against union members
who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id. at 430. The sanction imposed
also is important, of course, if it affects the employees' job rights. See id. at 428.
In Scofield v. NLRB, the Court considered whether a union may assess judicially en-
forced fines and suspensions on members who violate a bylaw limiting the amount of pro-
duction pay members may draw when performing piece-work. See 394 U.S. at 425. The
bylaw was enacted to combat the threat to members of an employer-instituted production
speed-up. See John Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-
Chalmers, Marine Workers and Scofield, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187, 193 (1969) (finding
the discipline in Scofield to be valid).
32. Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1112 n.37 (1964)
(Member Leedom dissenting).
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II. ALTERING RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER THROUGH THE
CONTAINMENT OF UNION DISCIPLINE
During the thirty years since the NLRB and the Supreme Court recon-
ceived section 8(b)(1)(A), the Board has decided hundreds of union dis-
cipline cases. Appendix B, entitled The Contemporary Reading of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1) (A) Regulation of Union Discipline, is provided for the reader
who is unfamiliar with this body of law or wishes to refresh his recollec-
tion. It summarizes some of the more important applications of the
NLRB rules governing union discipline.
Some cases, such as Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, develop from a
union's desire to resolve disputes internally prior to members seeking re-
lief from government. In others, union majorities occasionally discipline
members for various behavior associated with internal union political ac-
tivities. Most union discipline cases occur when unions use discipline to
gain leverage against employers to advance workers' collective inter-
ests.33 Examples are bans on crossing a picket line or assisting employers
attempting to discipline co-workers, or discipline for attempts to elimi-
nate the union through filing a decertification election petition or a peti-
tion in behalf of a rival union. When discipline is used to gain leverage,
as just described, interference by the state poses the greatest risk of di-
minishing workers' collective strength.
The 1980 case, GAIU Local 13-B (Western Publishing Co.), 34 is a good
example. There, a union attempted to gain bargaining leverage by disci-
plining members who performed compulsory overtime. The ban was en-
acted by a majority vote of the members of the local union at a special
meeting of the local's 490 members.35 The tactic was totally effective in
33. For example, Allis-Chalmers, in the union fined members who had crossed its
picket line established during a strike against the employer. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 177 (1967). The lawyer who argued the union's case in Allis-
Chalmers recounts that "in arguing the propriety of fines imposed on strikebreakers, the
union emphasized the legitimacy and importance of strike solidarity to the success and
even the very survival of the union." Silard, supra note 31, at 192. The Court agreed. It
viewed union fines for strikebreaking a legitimate and essential tool to maintain member
cohesion. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S. at 183. Therefore, a fundamental policy
choice animating such cases is that law must not be dismissive of a union majority's legiti-
mate interest in maintaining a united front during times of economic conflict with employ-
ers.
34. 252 N.L.R.B. 936 (1980), enforced, 682 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1982).
35. See NLRB v. GAIU Local 13-B, 682 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1982). The proposal
provided that "no overtime shall be worked by any member of Local 13-B Poughkeepsie,"
and any discipline taken against union members observing this ban "shall be considered an
action taken against all of the members and will be treated by the Local as a lock out."
1998]
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forcing an employer to withdraw a demand that the length of the work-
day be increased.36 Both the NLRB and the Court of Appeals acknowl-
edged the union's motive and did not dispute the democratic means used
to enact the ban.37 Nevertheless, both concluded that the union discipline
invoked against several members to enforce the overtime ban was unlaw-
ful because repeated refusal to perform compulsory overtime is an un-
protected concerted activity.38
The GAIU Local 13-B case illustrates how NLRB policy in union dis-
cipline cases can disarm the union. Nothing in the labor laws makes un-
ion inducement to refuse to work overtime an unfair labor practice. Yet
inducement through union discipline is made unlawful by the NLRB
through section 8(b)(1)(A). The legal reasoning is straightforward. It
begins with the proposition that union discipline violates section
8(b)(1)(A) if it contravenes an overriding policy of the labor laws, which
GAIU Local 13-B, 252 N.L.R.B. at 936. The 320 union members in attendance ratified the
overtime ban by a vote of 220 for and 100 against after a vigorous debate. See GAIU Lo-
cal 13-B, 682 F.2d at 306.
The ban on working overtime was also the membership majority's response to a widely
held perception that the company was unlawfully delaying the negotiations, undermining
its union by dealing directly with the employees, and otherwise failing to deal fairly with
the employees regarding negotiation of the new agreement. These were not idle percep-
tions. The NLRB Regional Director filed an unfair labor practice complaint against the
company alleging surface bargaining and direct dealing with the bargaining unit employ-
ees to bypass the union as the exclusive bargaining agent. See id.
The Regional Director subsequently amended the complaint to allege that the company
also had refused to meet with the union for several months and had unilaterally instituted
its last offer to the union prior to good faith impasse. See id.
36. Two days after the union promulgated its no-overtime rule, the company discon-
tinued all overtime, citing as its reason the risk of union fines for those who might choose
to violate the ban. Even when it later reinstituted mandatory overtime due to the needs of
one of its largest customers, the company stated that it did not intend to discipline any
employee who refused to work overtime. It was in response to this latest twist that certain
union members violated the union's overtime ban and were fined by the union. See GAIU
Local 13-B, 682 F.2d. at 306.
Four months after reinstating compulsory overtime, the company announced it unilater-
ally would implement its last contract offer to the union but would not, for now, unilater-
ally increase the length of the work day. One month thereafter, the union suspended the
overtime ban but stated it would be reinstated should the company increase the length of
the workday as it previously had proposed. The workday expansion threat was checked
by the union overtime ban, enforced through union discipline. See id.
37. The NLRB and the Court of Appeals agreed that the "overtime ban was ...
adopted.., solely as an economic weapon to improve the Union's bargaining position in
on-going negotiations." Id. at 310.
38. See id. at 308-09. The union unsuccessfully argued that the ban was in response to
the employer's unfair labor practices but both the NLRB and the Court rejected the claim.
See id. at 310; see also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 270 (1956) (finding
that a strike over serious unfair labor practices is protected notwithstanding a broad no-
strike clause in the contract).
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it does if it is invoked against a member for refusing to engage in conduct
unprotected by section 7 of the Act. A concerted refusal to perform
overtime is an unprotected concerted activity. Therefore, discipline for
violating a union work rule banning overtime work is unlawful. Q.E.D.!
Through this simple formulation, the NLRB and the courts have out-
lawed most union discipline used to provide the union leverage in its
economic struggles with employers. Examples are: union discipline for
crossing a picket line that violates a contractual no-strike clause;39 disci-
pline invoked for refusing to honor a picket line that violates the secon-
dary boycott laws; and discipline of members who cross an unlawful
picket line to work for a primary employer-an employer against whom
the union has every legal right to strike.0 Union attempts to promote
harmony among its members and the solidarity harmony brings are
thwarted by NLRB rules prohibiting union discipline of members who
harm co-workers by testifying against them in disciplinary proceedings"1
or signing witness statements harmful to co-workers. 2
39. See United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 1780, 296 N.L.R.B. 412, 419 (1989) (finding
unlawful a fine or any other discipline of a member for refusing to participate in sympathy
strike found by the NLRB as violative of a no-strike clause); Local 12419, Int'l Union of
Dist. 50 (National Grinding Wheel Co.), 176 N.L.R.B. 628, 632 (1969) (discussing how
union interests must be considered, but the union has no legitimate interest in discipline
for refusing to breach a no-strike clause).
40. See NLRB v. Local 18, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 503 F.2d 780, 783 (6th
Cir. 1974) (disagreeing with NLRB, and concluding that discipline for crossing an unlawful
picket line to work for primary was lawful); Local 388, United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices, 280 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1260 (1986) (finding that discipline for crossing an unlaw-
ful secondary boycott picket line to work for neutral was unlawful); see also Local 520,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 298 N.L.R.B. 768, 768 n.2 (1990) (disciplining workers for
crossing an unlawful picket line, violative of section 8(b)(7)(C), held unlawful).
41. See UMW Local 1058, 299 N.L.R.B. 389, 390-91 (1990) (recognizing the "argu-
ment that the Board should not stand in the way of a union's effort to discipline one of its
own who... has subverted the arbitration process in order to gain his own ends at the ex-
pense of a union brother").
42. See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 269 N.L.R.B. 129, 131 (1984)
(holding that discipline for signing a witness statement was harmful to the arbitration pro-
cess); see also Local Lodge D-357, Cement Workers, 288 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1158 (1988)
(finding it unlawful to reprimand but not otherwise discipline for signing a witness state-
ment).
The NLRB has held that a union lawfully may discipline a member who voluntarily in-
forms employers of a co-worker's misconduct. See Local 5795, Communications Workers,
192 N.L.R.B. 556, 557 (1971) (finding that imposing a fine for informing the employer of
co-employee infractions was lawful when the informer's job duties did not include in-
forming co-workers); accord Amalgamated Transit Union Local Div. No. 1225, 285
N.L.R.B. 1051 (1987). In addition, unions may protect members from perjured testimony
of other members. See Graphic Communications Int'l Union, 300 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1073
(1990) (disciplining union workers for giving perjured testimony at an arbitration hearing
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The open-textured possibilities of the reasoning in these cases is well-
illustrated in the 1992 decision of George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB.43
The employer fired an employee who already had been permanently re-
placed during an economic strike. The employee was discharged for
disloyalty because he had attended a rally that urged the boycott of the
employer's product." The Court of Appeals accepted the NLRB's find-
ing that the employee had no intent to advance the boycott by his atten-
dance and "did not carry a sign, wear a t-shirt or button, or otherwise ex-
press a position for or against the boycott. Nor did he speak at the
rally., 45 Also, having been permanently replaced, he was not drawing
wages from the employer when he attended the rally. Yet, the Second
Circuit found that the discharge was lawful. The court reasoned that the
employee's mere presence at the rally was an unprotected act of disloy-
alty since it swelled the ranks of those protesting.46
The Hormel case was not a union discipline case, but it might well have
been if a membership majority had voted that all members failing to at-
tend the rally were subject to discipline. Nothing in our labor law pro-
hibits a union from requiring members to attend such a rally, but induc-
ing attendance through union discipline can be made an unfair labor
practice since the discipline encourages unprotected concerted activity.
One can readily see that the ability of the NLRB and the courts to dis-
arm the union through outlawing union discipline is limited only by the
creativity and willingness to find employee self-help in dispute resolution
unprotected.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE SHIFT IN LABOR POLICY
The above discussion invites the question, why have the NLRB and the
courts shifted labor policy as they have to transfer bargaining power
away from unions? If one looks at these cases from the vantage point of
those who have been the winners, three emerge: the NLRB itself, indi-
vidual union members, and employers. Examining what each has gained
from these cases, and at what costs, may help clarify the social struggles
that operate below the surface in labor law cases and the choices that le-
gal institutions made regarding unresolved tensions within those strug-
gles.
was held lawful when perjury was determined by forum other than internal union proce-
dures).
43. 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
44. See id. at 1063-64.
45. Id. at 1063.
46. See id. at 1066.
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A. The Bureaucratic Power Aggrandizement Theory
It has been suggested that the impulse of "state managers" to add to
their own "institutional power and prestige" must be considered when
trying to understand decision making by judges or labor-relations bu-
reaucrats. 47 To test that idea, we might examine the two arguments de-
ployed to support the NLRB's expansive view that a union may not use
control of union discipline to compel a member's participation in activity
that Congress has not protected in section 7 of the Act. First, unions
have no fair claim of autonomy to use their control of members to ad-
vance outcomes that contravene labor policy. Second, a union member
is placed in an untenable situation when a union threatens discipline for
refusing to engage in unprotected concerted activity: resistance to the
union's demands may result in union discipline while compliance may re-
sult in the employer's discipline, including discharge.
The first justification parallels NLRB claims in other cases that if some
union activity contravenes labor policy, the NLRB has inherent power to
outlaw it even though Congress has not. On at least four previous occa-
sions the United States Supreme Court has rejected this version of
NLRB authority.
In 1946, in In re Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.,4 8 the Board found that an
employer violated the Wagner Act when it discharged an employee un-
der a closed shop agreement when the employer knew the employee had
lost its union membership because of activity protected by section 7-
there dual unionism. The Supreme Court's response, in a 1949 reversal,
was sharp. The Board, the Court stated, had ignored the plain provisions
of a contract, lawful at the time, in an attempt to "reform [the Wagner
Act] to conform to the Board's idea of correct policy .... To sustain the
Board's contention would be to permit the Board under the guise of
administration to put limitations in the statute not placed there by
Congress ... [through] 'administrative amendment.'"4 9
A few years later, in NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local
Union No. 639,'° the Court again had to warn the Board about attempted
47. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at xiii (citing Fred Block, 33 SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
6 (1977)); see also Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws," 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 27 (noting that "[s]tate actors
also have interests of their own-in careers, advancement, and, no doubt, other things-
and these may materially affect the terms of particular compromise arrangements").
48. 70 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1946), enforced, 171 F.2d 956, rev'd, 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
49. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 388 U.S. 355,363-64 (1949).
50. 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
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administrative amendment of the statute. There, a minority union peace-
fully picketed an employer's business with the object of obtaining recog-
nition to represent the employer's employees. If recognition had been
granted, the employer would have violated section 8(a)(2) of the Act."
Prior to 1959, the labor laws did not explicitly prohibit such union pick-
eting to obtain recognition. 2 Undeterred, the Board concluded that the
picketing violated the Act, using section 8(b)(1)(A) as the vehicle,
"'[b]ecause the object of the Union's picketing in this case was to force
the Company to commit an act prohibited by the statute itself, and...
deprive the employees of a right expressly guaranteed to them by the...
Act."'53 The Supreme Court disagreed, this time relying primarily on sec-
tion 13 of the Act. That section, the Court pointed out, denies the
NLRB the authority to "'impede or diminish in any way"' the right to
strike "except as specifically provided for" in the Act.54 This means that
"[section] 13 declares a rule of construction which cautions against an
expansive reading of [section 8(b)(1)(A)] which would adversely affect
- the right to strike, unless the congressional purpose to give it that mean-
ing persuasively appears either from the structure or history of the stat-
ute."55 The Court concluded that Congress did not enact section
8(b)(1)(A) in order to empower the NLRB to "sit in judgment upon, and
to condemn, a... union's resort to a specific economic weapon.
56
In 1961, the Court again had to caution the Labor Board against add-
ing limits on union activities that Congress had not chosen to add when
enacting the Taft-Hartley Act. In Local 357, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. NLRB,57 the Board found that section 8(b)(2) condemned
per se a union-employer exclusive hiring hall agreement notwithstanding
that the agreement contained "an express provision that employees
would not be discriminated against because they were or were not union
members."58 The Court rejected the Board's per se approach. The Court
51. See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731,732-33 (1961).
52. It was not until 1959 that Congress regulated such union picketing to achieve rec-
ognition. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1994) (section 8(b)(7) of the Labor Management
Relations Act as amended by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959).
53. See Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. at 280 (quoting 119 N.L.R.B. 232, 238 (1957)).
54. Id. at 281 n. 9 (quoting section 13 of the NLRA).
55. Id. at 282. (stating that "[section] 13 is a command of Congress to the courts to
resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an interpretation of [section] 8(b)(1)(A) which
safeguards the right to strike as understood prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act").
56. Id.
57. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
58. Id. at 669.
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explained that Congress could have, but did not, ban all union hiring hall
agreements. Accordingly, the Court reasoned,
There being no express ban of hiring halls in any provision of
the Act, those who add one, . . . engage in a legislative act....
It may be that hiring halls need more regulation than the Act
presently affords .... Yet, where Congress has adopted a selec-
tive system for dealing with evils, the Board is confined to that
system. . . . [T]he Board cannot go farther and establish a
broader, more pervasive regulatory scheme.59
A very similar issue arose again in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Interna-
tional Union,"' this time through the attempted use of section 8(b)(3) of
the Act. For a fourth time the Supreme Court foiled the Board's effort
to limit union economic weapons. In Insurance Agents', a union had
used certain harassing tactics to gain bargaining leverage during a collec-
tive bargaining dispute.61 Constituting a partial strike, these harassing tac-
tics were unprotected concerted activity. 2 The employer was privileged,
if it had chosen, to discipline employees engaging in the partial strike, in-
cluding discharging them. The NLRB concluded that the partial strike,
used as a union bargaining tactic, constitutes bad faith bargaining viola-
tive of section 8(b)(3). The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that
Congress had been "rather specific when it has come to outlaw[ing] par-
ticular economic weapons on the part of unions... [and that] the activi-
ties here involved have never been specifically outlawed by Congress."63
Accordingly, the NLRB had no authority to supplement the statute ad-
ministratively to have it conform to the Board's view of proper labor
policy. Administrative lawmaking by the NLRB threatened the policy
that bargaining outcomes are to be determined through a process of pri-
vate ordering, not governmental fiat. As the Court said, "if the Board
could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as part
of collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable
influence upon the substantive terms on which the parties contract."
64
What Congress left unregulated it intended to be available to the parties
59. Id. at 674, 676.
60. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
61. See id. at 480. The employees refused to solicit new business, follow certain re-
porting procedures, and attend meetings. In addition they picketed the company offices
and set their own arrival and departure times. See id.
62. See Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333,336-37 (1950).
63. See Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 498.
64. Id. at 490.
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S65 6as self-help alternatives unregulated by any governmental entity.66
These repeated rebukes of the Board by the Supreme Court expose
the error in the argument that the Board has inherent authority under
section 8(b)(1)(A), or any other section of the Act, to ban union conduct
it determines frustrates some policy in our labor laws. In NLRB v. Sco-
field,67 it is true that the Court, in dicta, invited the Board to oversee the
purposes of union discipline, but limited the Board's authority to pro-
hibiting union discipline that contravenes or frustrates "overriding" poli-
cies in our labor laws. The Board disregards this limit when it bans all
union discipline that induces a member to engage in any conduct that is
not protected by the Act. To read Scofield otherwise is to assume that
the Court intended in Scofield to provide the NLRB the very open-
textured authority to supplement Congress's work that it has repeatedly
denied the Board in other contexts.68
65. See id. at 499-500 (stating that the NLRB is not authorized to determine the par-
ties' permissible economic weapons in an effort to create an "ideal" or "balanced" context
for bargaining); accord Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1953) (stating that the
NLRA policy is not to prohibit all economic weapons "but only that ascertained by its
prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions").
66. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this point emphatically when a state labor rela-
tions commission attempted to make a union's refusal to work overtime (another form of
partial strike) a violation of state law. In Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court found such state laws
are preempted by federal labor law. The parties' use of economic pressure is not a
grudging exception to our labor laws but rather is part and parcel of the congressional
plan. Congress's choice neither to protect nor prohibit certain conduct has a specific in-
tent: to leave such conduct unregulated by any government agency and instead controlled
by the free play of economic forces.
67. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
68. In December 1946, six months before the enactment of Taft-Hartley, the NLRB
forwarded a remarkable memorandum on labor legislation to the President. In it, the
Board urged that no new labor legislation was needed, arguing in part that the responsi-
bility for directing the course of labor policy is best left with the Board rather than Con-
gress. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 271-72. As a last-ditch effort to deflect a conserva-
tive counterattack on the New Deal labor relations system, the December memorandum
might be dismissed as a political instrument, part of an effort "to commit the Truman ad-
ministration to a gradualist strategy [of reform]." Id. at 273-74 (discussing the memoran-
dum as part of the flurry of activity in the spring of 1947 effectuating a "strategy of reform
through administrative discretion"). Or, the December memorandum might reflect what
Professor Tomlins has referred to as "[tihe Board's desire to retain the whip hand in the
design and implementation of revisions in federal policy." Id. at 272. In either event, the
congressional rejection of the Board's 1946 entreaty, combined with the repeated post-
1947 rebukes by the Supreme Court that the Board was not privileged to direct labor pol-
icy by adding restraints on the right to strike that Congress did not clearly provide, rein-
force the argument that the Board lacks authority to design and implement labor policy
through the union discipline cases.
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The second argument mounted in support of the NLRB's authority in
its modern union discipline cases is that the union places the member in a
double bind when it disciplines because the member refuses to engage in
unprotected concerted activity. In the GAIU Local 13-B case discussed
above, the Court of Appeals repeatedly returned to this theme stating
that "[a] union rule requiring an employee to engage in ... unprotected
activity, even though adopted by a majority of the union's members,
amounts to an unlawful restraint or coercion .... It forces them [the
members] ... to risk being lawfully discharged by their employer or sub-
jected to lawful imposition of disciplinary measures."6 9 This argument
raises a false conflict.
Since as early as the Scofield decision in 1969, it has been clear that the
union may enforce its rules only "against union members who are free to
leave the union and escape the rule."7° If a member resigns, the union
may not lawfully enforce its rules against that person.71 In 1985, the Su-
preme Court made plain that the union may place no limits on the right
to resign.7 Accordingly, there is no conflict. A union member desiring
to avoid risking employer and union discipline may resign from the union
and comply with the employer's lawful demands.
There are costs associated with resignation from union membership.
The former member no longer is privileged to participate in the internal
governance of the union. In almost every union this forfeiture includes
exclusion from membership meetings and denial of the right to vote
upon matters properly before the membership and ineligibility to be
nominated and elected to union office. In many American communities
there also may be social stigma associated with a refusal to conform to
group norms at the workplace. Our labor policy accepts these costs as
necessary to accommodate the twin goals of voluntary unionism and
collective empowerment.73
69. NLRB v. GAIU Local 13-B, 682 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1982).
70. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423,430 (1969).
71. See Booster Lodge No. 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88-89
(1973) (stating that lawful resignation terminates a union's right to discipline); NLRB v.
Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union, 409 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1972) (rejecting the
argument that by participating in a strike vote, a member waives the right to resign and
engage in strikebreaking).
72. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
73. See Distillery Workers Union, Local 186, 296 N.L.R.B. 519, 520 (1989) (Chairman
Stephens concurring) (stating that a member's freedom to resign from a union and "[give]
up the benefits and obligations of union membership" was properly considered in a case
involving a fine for announcing a fixed intent not to honor a union's lawful picket line);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 593 (S & M Grocers), 237 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1161 (1978)
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In the Scofield case itself, if members conformed to the majority's de-
sires and agreed not to collect pay for work in excess of the union-
imposed production ceiling, they sacrificed income. If they defied the
majority's wishes, they risked union discipline. The Supreme Court per-
ceived no conflict. As the Court said, "if members are prevented from
taking advantage of their contractual rights bargained for all employees
it is because they have chosen to become and remain union members."74
The negative implication is that the cost of exclusion from the union's
political and, perhaps, social community is an acceptable price for exer-
cising a member's individual autonomy to resign from the union."
Of course, labor policy sometimes does protect a member from having
to make the choice of conforming to group norms or resigning from the
union. In Scofield, the Court's direction to the NLRB was to relieve the
union member of having to make that choice only when conforming to
group norms would frustrate an "overriding" policy in the labor laws.
When would that be?
If Congress has made union inducement of certain behavior an unfair
labor practice, then any union conduct, including union discipline, to in-
duce that behavior is unlawful: union discipline to induce members to
violate the secondary boycott laws, for example, is, and should be, unlaw-
ful. Nor may union discipline be used to frustrate any other goal Con-
gress explicitly has set forth in our labor law. Access to the NLRB comes
to mind. The goals of union democratic governance as provided by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 6 is an-
other example. Similarly, would it not seem to follow that a union frus-
(finding the imposition of a fine for refusing to assist a union in an organizing drive was
lawful and any associated interference with free speech rights is not controlling as a mem-
ber is free to leave the union to avoid a rule); see also NLRB v. IBEW Local 340, 481 U.S.
573, 595-96 (1987) (holding that a member-supervisors' right to resign from the union to
avoid discipline should be considered in determining whether union discipline violates sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B)).
74. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 435.
75. In Meat Cutters, Local 593 (S & M Grocers), 237 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1978), members
claimed that union discipline for refusing to assist in organizing violates overriding policies
in the labor laws because it interferes with free speech rights. The Board disagreed, argu-
ing that members could resign to avoid the rule. The Board stated:
As members, they participate in the election of officers and in the other internal
affairs of the Union which lead to the decision to organize particular employees.
They are free to resign any time the Union sets out on a course they do not agree
with.... However, as long as they remain members, the Union has a right to ex-
pect their support, including actual participation in the Union's organizational ef-
forts.
Meat Cutters, 237 N.L.R.B. at 1161.
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1994).
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trates "overriding" labor policy when it disciplines a member who has re-
fused to commit a crime on its behalf or refuses to be the instrument
through which a union engages in some unfair labor practice specifically
described in the Act?
But conduct Congress has neither prohibited by section 8 of the Act nor
protected by section 7, and which is not otherwise unlawful, is conduct
Congress intended to be permitted as self-help available to the parties.
For example, we know from previous litigation, as discussed above, that
Congress intended overtime bans to be reserved as self-help measures,
neither to be prohibited nor protected but rather permitted. Is not a
union rule against performing overtime then exactly what Congress had
in mind when it determined that for some union rules members either
must comply or resign? What "overriding" labor policy is frustrated by
putting a member to this choice? If the Board lacks justification in out-
lawing discipline for failure to comply with overtime bans, then the
Board similarly is incorrect in banning union discipline to induce any
other behavior that is neither prohibited nor protected-such as striking
in breach of a no-strike clause, refusing to testify against a co-worker at
an arbitration hearing, signing a witness statement against a co-worker,
or any other conduct Congress has chosen neither to prohibit nor pro-
tect. In its zeal to supplement Congress's work to effectuate labor policy,
the Board has not acted with the restraint contemplated by the Scofield
decision that limits the Board to outlawing union discipline that contra-
venes "overriding" policies in our labor laws.
The above discussion makes plausible that regulatory zeal has contrib-
uted to some of the immoderation seen in the union discipline cases.
What weakens this explanation, however, is that these union discipline
cases are so harmful to workers' collective empowerment. It seems un-
likely that all of this harm to unions, or even most of it, could reasonably
be explained by even unconscious desires of state industrial relations
managers to enhance their own power and prestige when one considers
that so many Boards appointed by so many different Presidents from so
many different political persuasions have joined in these cases during the
past thirty years. Accordingly, one is drawn to explanations implicating
the interests of the other winners in the union discipline cases: individual
union members and employers. That inquiry might profitably begin by
clarifying how Wagner and Taft-Hartley work together to provide the
state with the conceptual and ideological bases to protect these interests
from perceived excesses of worker collective empowerment.
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
B. The Source of the State's Moral Authority to Regulate Union Conduct
The conventional wisdom is that the Taft-Hartley Act is best under-
stood by focusing not on what it did, but on what it did not do. It added
new restraints on worker collective action, but it did not jettison the na-
tional commitment to collective bargaining as the preferred mechanism
for resolving and avoiding industrial conflict, contrary to the desires of
some of the statute's proponents. 7 In other words, the conventional view
is Taft-Hartley nibbled at the margins of national labor policy created by
the Wagner Act but maintained its core. What too easily can be lost in
this observation is that this core of Wagner, which Taft-Hartley pre-
served, provided the state all of the conceptual and ideological founda-
tions necessary for the control of union internal life we see today.
In 1916, the dissenters on the Commission of Industrial Relations of-
fered a prophetic observation. They pointed out that "if the State recog-
nizes any particular union by requiring the employer to recognize it, the
State must necessarily guarantee the union to the extent that it must strip
it of any abuses that it may practice. It would follow that the state also
must guarantee unions if labor policy incorporates the exclusivity princi-
ple: that the bargaining representative chosen by the majority of the bar-
gaining unit employees is imposed on the minority.
The Wagner Act, of course, did both. It actively facilitates union rep-
77. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 33 (1986) (stating that the "Taft-Hartley act... did not alter in
any significant fashion the basic NLRA principles governing industrial relations activity");
TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 251.
While the [Taft-Hartley] act established beyond doubt Congress's determination
to limit the influence of entrenched labor organizations, . . . the ambitions of
some of its proponents to go further than this and overthrow the model of labor
relations established in the United States after 1940 remained unfulfilled. The
Taft-Hartley Act thus proved much less of a break with the past than has usually
been assumed.
Id. at 280-81 (discussing the view of Ludwig Teller, a corporation attorney, that the Wag-
ner Act had been a "watershed," that "little in the pre-Wagner situation ... has survived,"
and accordingly, "the advocates of the 1947 amendments had had little alternative but to
accept the Wagner Act's polic[ies]"); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and
the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1567 (1996) (noting that while the Taft-
Hartley Act contains provisions limiting the right to self-organization, the amendments
"did not disturb the NLRA's commitment to collective bargaining as the essential means
of attaining the multiple goals [of the Wagner Act]").
78. COMMISSION ON INDUS. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY, S. Doc.
No. 64-415, at 212 (1st Sess. 1916); see also CLYDE W. SUMMERS & HARRY H.
WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 19 (1968) (querying whether
government-compelled recognition of unions would give unions "special legal status ...
lead[ing] to government control of the union's bargaining policies and its internal affairs").
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resentation through the combination of state-supervised elections, the
exclusivity principle, and the federally enforced duty to bargain. Adding
these provisions was the "decisive step" in the evolution of labor policy,
79
because for the first time unions were provided access to the coercive
power of the state, both to enforce a duty to bargain and to impose
themselves on an unwilling minority of bargaining unit employees. The
state had acquired the moral authority, perhaps the duty, to guarantee
unions and to pay some attention to how they obtained representative
status and exercised it. It did not take long for many in the trade union
movement to realize that governmental support of unions came at con-
siderable cost, excessive in the minds of some who expressed the hope
that the Wagner Act either would be held unconstitutional or repealed at
the earliest opportunity.80
In Taft-Hartley, Congress self-consciously endeavored to guarantee
unions to the extent of regulating directly important aspects of their gov-
ernance at the workplace. More significantly, Taft-Hartley moved state
regulation of unions directly into the realm of union internal governance,
albeit haltingly. It prohibited excessive or discriminatory union initiation
fees.81 It required unions to file union financial reports and other reports
with the Secretary of Labor in an effort to foster greater democratic pro-
cedures within unions.2 And unions desiring the services of the NLRB
were required to have their officers file non-Communist affidavits'.3
Other provisions that would have much more extensively regulated un-
ion internal life were rejected for fear of creating "complete and unlim-
79. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 115.
80. See id. at 144 (stating that Dan Tobin, President of the Teamsters Union, hoped
the Wagner Act would be held unconstitutional); id. at 145 (stating that A.O. Wharton,
President of the Machinists Union, hoped that the Act would be repealed). In the early
years following the enactment of Wagner, union leaders found this control over their
autonomy unnerving, and for good reason. Soon after Wagner, the Board began rejecting
the jurisdictional claims of many AFL unions, forcing an internal restructuring within
some of them. This development, stated one contemporary observer, "means State con-
trol of trade union organizations, jurisdictions, elections; indeed, the death of trade union-
ism as we now know it." Id. at 123 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Wallace B. Don-
ham of the Harvard Business School).
81. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 8(b)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(5) (1994).
82. See id. § 9(f)-(g), 29 U.S.C. § 159(f)-(g) (repealed 1959).
83. See id. § 9(h), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (repealed 1959). The constitutionality of section
9(h) was upheld in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds. See 339 U.S. 382, 415
(1950). It was replaced in 1959 by a criminal provision, section 504(a) of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, which was held unconstitutional in United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 438, 462 (1965).
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ited control by the Federal Government of the internal affairs of any la-
bor organization. "'
But even after Taft-Hartley, there remained one imposing bastion of
union autonomy from the state: unions were to enjoy broad autonomy in
their relations with their members. Both the section 8(b)(1)(A) legisla-
tive history and the early section 8(b)(1)(A) case law demonstrate that
the Taft-Hartley amendments were initially wrapped tightly with gov-
ernment's commitment to abstain-to respect unions' autonomy to gov-
ern themselves internally. It was this government commitment of self-
restraint that was in full retreat by the late 1960s and early 1970s in the
union discipline cases. The question remains, why?
Part of the answer, and perhaps too easy a part, is that the die was cast
in Allis-Chalmers. Provisions in union constitutions for judicially en-
forced fines for crossing a picket line were relatively uncommon prior to
the 1960s. 8' That changed by 1969 when the Court decided Allis-
Chalmers. Having sought and obtained endorsement of its access to the
coercive power of government to enforce its fines against members judi-
cially, unions hardly could expect government to remain indifferent to
86the circumstances surrounding the fines it was asked to enforce. The
Wagner Act had established the precedent of government guaranteeing
unions when it provided unions access to its coercive power. So what is
so stunning about the union discipline cases is not that government re-
served the right to oversee the reasons for union discipline, but that the
NLRB has so aggressively disarmed worker groups in the process.
John Silard, who represented the unions in several of the early Su-
preme Court union discipline cases, has suggested that "[a]s often hap-
pens, changing national sentiments in the years following the original en-
actment of Taft-Hartley gave rise to a new emphasis and an attempted
reconstruction of the legislative aim [of section 8(b)(1)(A)]. 87  This
seems plausible. Since the reconstruction of section 8(b)(1)(A) in the
union discipline cases furthers the interests of individual members and
employers, at the expense of the group interests of workers, the appro-
84. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 77 (1947).
85. See Atleson, supra note 12, at 696-97 (citing Thomas G.S. Christensen, Union
Discipline Under Federal Law: Institutional Dilemmas in an Industrial Democracy, 43
N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 270 (1968)).
86. See Marcoux, supra note 11, at 1422-23 (describing the nature and scope of a un-
ion's ability to impose court-enforceable fines); Atleson, supra note 12, at 709 (noting that
"Allis-Chalmers may have ironically opened the door to further federal intrusion into un-
ion disciplinary proceedings").
87. Silard, supra note 31, at 188.
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priate focus should be on the changed sentiments related to their inter-
ests.
C. Changing National Sentiments Regarding the Meaning of Individual
Economic Liberty
"As [President Lyndon] Johnson departed from his inaugural ball in
January 1965, he warned his aides, 'Don't stay up late. There's work to
be done. We're on our way to the Great Society."' 8 The Great Society
was "aimed to go beyond the bread-and-butter liberalism of the New
Deal [and] guarantee 'rights' and government entitlements."' 9 The
"rights-consciousness" reflected in the Great Society and accelerated by
it invites one to inquire whether the union discipline cases that so un-
dermine employee group interests can be situated within a set of changed
national sentiments redefining the meaning of individual liberty. That
inquiry might best begin by examining the Wagner Act's solution to the
competing values of individual rights and group authority.
Senator Wagner and those who designed the Wagner Act mediated an
uneasy truce between worker collective authority and worker individual
rights through use of the exclusivity principle.9° The Wagner Act was un-
compromisingly committed to voluntarism-voluntary consent must re-
solve the question of whether to have a union. But as one commentator
has put it, this commitment to voluntary consent "blur[red] the line be-
tween individual and group consent, in the name of collective
empowerment. '" 91 The Wagner Act solves the free choice puzzle by
viewing consent "as a group rather than an individual phenomenon. ' 9,
Wagner argued that "'[i]n modem society, the welfare of the individual is
embedded in the destiny of the group."' 9 The group "'preserve[s] order
within its own ranks [and] restrain[s] the untimely and wayward acts of
88. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND ExPECTATIONs: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-
1974, at 562 (1996).
89. Id. at 563.
90. It would be a mistake to overstate the degree Wagner had reconciled these com-
peting claims for up to the end, there was much "ambivalence and tension in Wagner's
own thinking." Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Sym-
bol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1496 (1993); see also Rogers,
supra note 47, at 2 n.3 (stating that "this problem of tension between the requirements of
collective action and other liberal values is an old one").
91. Barenberg, supra note 90, at 1454.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1455 (quoting Robert F. Wagner, Planning in Place of Restraint, 22 SURV.
GRAPHIC 395 (1933)).
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irresponsible groups.' 94
The Wagner Act was thus built on the apparent paradox of advancing
liberty by denying it.95 In order to achieve individual power at the work-
place, one must join the collective but that entails costs to individual
freedoms. Conservatives in the immediate post-Wagner era had no
problem attacking the idea that consent was "a group rather than an in-
dividual phenomenon."96 They argued that by "'delegat[ing] to private
organizations of citizens the power to control jobs and work [operated]
as 'a vehicle of despotism [which] attacks the fundamental rights of the
individual and extols collectivism as opposed to individualism."" 9, This
view gained strength, and Taft-Hartley reinforced it-more comprehen-
sively than often is understood.
Immediately following the enactment of Taft-Hartley, Professor
Archibald Cox observed that the greatest impact of Taft-Hartley "lies
less in the actual changes in the statute than in the philosophy on which
they are based. 9 He explained that in shifting labor policy from one of
affirmatively encouraging union organization to one of governmental in-
difference to the spread of labor unions, the statute rejected "the phi-
losophy which looks upon a labor union as the employees themselves." 99
Professor Cox argued that Taft-Hartley labor policy looks upon the un-
94. Id. at 1454 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 4229, 4230 (1934)). Wagner asked whether a
"democratic process whereby the majority of the workers represent the interests of their
group in dealing with employer" would not be far preferable than "despotic control of all
by the employer [in the non-union workplace]." Id. at 1454 n.325.
95. The paradox is more apparent than real if one accepts the understanding of real-
ity adopted by Wagner and the proponents of the Wagner Act. To them, the freedom to
negotiate the individual employment contract was illusory. As Professor Barenberg has
summarized their view:
There was no actual liberty of contract in the employer-employee relation be-
cause 'when a man is without means to subsist upon, his wants compel him to
work, and he must ask for employment as a favor from someone who has the
property required to carry on productive work.' Because the workers 'do not
consent, [because] they submit but they do not agree,' wage labor was a form of
'industrial slavery.'
Id. at 1489 (quoting DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND RADICAL
REPUBLICANS, 1862-1872, at 239 (1967)).
96. Id. at 1454.
97. TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 275 (citing Lawrence to Herzog, (4 April 1947), in
(Herzog Papers)).
98. Cox, Part One, supra note 10, at 45. Two years later, Arthur Goldberg referred
to the "incalculable effects" on "industrial mores" caused by Taft-Hartley. Barenberg,
supra note 90, at 1492 n.476 (internal quotations omitted) (citing CIO, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ELEVENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 124 (1949)).
99. Cox, Part One, supra note 10, at 25.
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ion more as a service organization, and the member as a "'customer
about to buy an article with both the union and the employer competing
for his allegiance, trade, and support."" This changed philosophy, Pro-
fessor Cox predicted, threatened to undercut the view that "[b]y organ-
izing, the employees form a group, choose leaders, and surrender some
measure of their freedom to take individual action."'' 1 The logical exten-
sion of this uncoupling of the group from the individual was the need to
erase some of the blurring of the line between individual and group con-
sent found in the Wagner Act. Taft-Hartley did this by creating new
zones of individual consent enforceable against the group. The clearest
examples of these zones are the elimination of the closed shop, the
regulation of the union shop, and the addition of the right to refrain from
concerted activities in section 7.102
This philosophical uncoupling of the individual from the group came to
full bloom in the late 1960s, a period punctuated by vigorous changes in
the conception of both civil rights and liberties. The drive for civil rights
and liberties had achieved an undeniable moral force.' 3 Congress re-
sponded to this drive by enacting laws prohibiting workplace discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, national origin, gender, and age.'04
Congress reflected and accelerated the trend by providing government-
financed entitlements through a broad array of legislation.05 The Su-
100. Id. at 46 (quoting Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S.
55 and Sen. Jt. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1700 (1947) (testimony of Stephen F. Dunn)).
101. Id.
102. Professor Tomlins has argued that "[s]tating the right to refrain explicitly was of
considerable symbolic importance [but] former Board chairman Harry A. Millis later con-
firmed that it 'only made explicit what had been implicit and always so regarded by the
NLRB.'" TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 290.
103. Senator Everett Dirkson of Illinois, a Midwestern conservative who sided with
business interests during the 1947 Taft-Hartley debate, understood the period better than
most. Recognizing that the drive for civil rights and liberties had achieved an undeniable
moral power, he stated that "'[n]o army can withstand the strength of an idea whose time
has come.... In the history of mankind, there is an inexorable moral force that moves us
forward."' PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 546 (Professor Patterson reported that the
quoted lines are attributed to Victor Hugo).
104. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). To this list has more recently been added the Ameri-
cans with Disability Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
105. See PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 568-69. Some examples are: federal aid to
elementary and secondary education, immigration reform, guarantees of voting rights,
Medicare and Medicaid, clean air legislation, prohibition of billboard advertising on inter-
state highways, student loan programs, laws improving mine safety, occupational safety,
consumer protection, a war on poverty, and promotion of cultural life through creation of
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preme Court weighed in by rendering landmark decisions extending the
Bill of Rights protections and the Fourteenth Amendment in the areas of
civil rights, voting rights, free speech, religion, and rights of criminal de-
fendants.0 6
The historian James Patterson has concluded that the decisions of the
Warren Court accelerated the "rise of rights-consciousness [which] began
to seem all-conquering by 1965. " '07 Liberals were inspired. Conserva-
tives were enraged. Changed national sentiments had created "an in-
creasingly powerful-and ultimately near-irresistible--drive for the ex-
pansion of individual rights in the United States.... A Rights Revolution
was at hand. 1.8
The rights revolution no doubt moved the NLRB and the courts "to
enhance the individual rights of the union member.""1 ° Certainly, some
union discipline cases self-consciously reflect a preference for individual
rights over group rights. One can see this influence in cases giving union
members the unqualified right to resign from the union."' It can also be
seen in cases restricting union discipline of members for dual unionism or
for filing a decertification petition, and in cases barring discipline for en-
gaging in internal union political activities."'
In addition, elsewhere during the 1960s, courts were expanding the
rights of the individual against the group in labor law cases. The duty of
fair representation that the Court had first recognized in 1944 in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad"2 was applied to Taft-Hartley Act unions
in 1955 in Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 23,11 and
the National Endowment for the Humanities and National Endowment for the Arts. See
id.
106. See id. at 565-67.
107. Id. at 568.
108. Id.
109. David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor
Law: Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1268, 1309 (1988); accord Colette M. Foissotte, Justice Brennan and Union Disci-
pline Under the NLRA: The Fight for Solidarity Impinges Upon Individual Rights, 20 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 127, 133 (1986) (stating that the post-Allis-Chalmers union discipline
decisions "attempt to balance the employee's [individual] right to refrain from engaging in
concerted activities against the union's [collective] need for strength and solidarity").
Allis-Chalmers generated a considerable academic response, much of jt expressing the
"fear of a green light for union abuse." See Abraham, supra, at 1308 ni.184; id. at 1307
n.183 (collecting authority).
110. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1985) (explaining that
the purpose of section 8(b)(1)(A) was to ensure unions could not make rules restricting
the right to resign).
111. See authority cited at Appendix B.
112. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
113. 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam).
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made a section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice in 1962 in the Miranda
Fuel Co. Inc. case.' In 1961, the Court for the first time held that one
who pays money to a union pursuant to an agency fee arrangement has a
right under the Railway Labor Act to insist that the union return that
portion of the fee equal to the percentage of the union's expenditures
used for political purposes.' The dues rebate cases of the 1960s have
been the foundation for finding in section 8(b)(1)(A) a similar right for
nonmembers who pay union fees pursuant to Taft-Hartley Act union se-
curity arrangements.'
6
Moreover, judicial rhetoric during those years demonstrates great con-
cern for collective overreaching within unions. Justice Douglas espe-
cially articulated this concern, the two most prominent expositions being
his Emporium dissent"7 and his concurring opinion in International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street.118 In Emporium, Justice Douglas warned against
union members being made "prisoners of the union,"' 9 and in Street, he
acknowledged the necessity of some forced associations but pleaded for
"special safeguards ... lest ... we all succumb to regimentation" and be
forced to surrender "matters of conscience, belief, or expression."'
20
I do not think, however, that the rights revolution can account for
nearly as much of the transformation of section 8(b)(1)(A) as some peo-
ple think. First, the rights revolution explanation is hopelessly underin-
clusive. Too many union discipline cases simply do not fit. For example,
what individual rights values are preserved by prohibiting unions from
114. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); see also
Independent Metal Workers Union Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574 (1964) (refusing to
process grievances for racial reasons an unfair labor practice because breach of duty of fair
representation).
115. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961) (stating
that an individual employee may obtain a refund of any fees the union used for political
causes of which the employee was opposed); see also Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
116. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988); California
Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995).
117. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975)
(Douglas J., dissenting).
118. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). One commentator has described Justice Douglas's views as
an "abstract and atomistic conception of our society [where] [c]ollective action is under-
taken by individuals whose connection to each other is presumed to be limited to the
workplace, unrelated to the concrete conditions under which they live [and where the]
great fear is collective overreaching." Abraham, supra note 109, at 1281.
119. 420 U.S. at 73.
120. Street, 367 U.S. at 775-77; see also Abraham, supra note 109, at 1281 (discussing
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Emporium).
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disciplining a member who crosses a union picket line that violates a no-
strike clause, or discipline of a member who refuses to comply with the
group's decision not to perform overtime work, or discipline for cooper-
ating with an employer during an arbitration proceeding by testifying
against another worker or signing a witness statement harmful to a co-
worker? The argument that discipline in these situations places the
member in a double bind of being disciplined either by the employer or
by the union is a false conflict, as has been discussed. The member can
resolve all conflict by the simple act of resigning from the union. These
bans on discipline are much more calculated to preserve employer inter-
ests by weakening the union's efforts to resist employers' demands
through a show of solidarity.
This leads to the second weakness in the view that the individual rights
revolution can explain the union discipline cases of the late 1960s and
1970s. In many of these cases, not only were employers the big winners,
but employers brought the actions, financed them, or otherwise were ac-
tive supporters of the litigation. Current NLRB Board Chairman Gould
conducted research in 1980 demonstrating that in many of these cases
members were represented by employer counsel and employers not un-
commonly filed the unfair labor practice charges."' He concluded that a
"dispute between the union and the worker [here] is actually part of the
power struggle between labor and management. 1 22 Abraham's research
shows that "[i]n all the key cases in this area, . . . unfair labor practice
charges were filed by employers who assuredly were acting primarily in
their own interests and only secondarily as guardians of the individual
rights of workers., 123 His conclusion was that these cases were "political
initiatives cast on the legal waters.' ' 24 In NLRB v. Granite State Joint
121. William B. Gould, Solidarity Forever-Or Hardly Ever: Union Discipline, Taft-
Hartley, and the Right of Union Members to Resign, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 74, 112-13
(1980).
122. Id.; accord Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1983) (ac-
knowledging that the union's attempt to restrict member resignations during a strike was
calculated to deny the employer the aid provided by the services of the returning former
member), affd, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
123. Abraham, supra note 109, at 1316-17 n.245. Obviously, the Allis-Chalmers Cor-
poration was a party in the NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers case. In Pattern Makers' League, em-
ployer representatives filed the unfair labor practice charges against the union urging the
Board to find the union's restriction on the right to resign a violation of section
8(b)(1)(A). See 473 U.S. at 98. The employer also filed the charges in Booster Lodge No.
405, IAM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380 (1970).
124. Abraham, supra note 109, at 1272 (expressing the view that the political initiative
was by an "'unidimensional' National Labor Relations Board").
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Board, Textile Workers Union,"' a case involving the issue of members'
right to resign during a strike to avoid union discipline for crossing a law-
ful picket line, not only did the employer bring the litigation, but clear
evidence demonstrated that the employer procured resignation letters as
part of an effort to break the strike. 6 Attention therefore needs to be
given to changes in national sentiments that may clarify why labor policy
shifted from supporting group rights of workers to one more supportive
of employers' ability to resist collective bargaining.
D. Changing National Sentiments Regarding Public Support for
Collective Bargaining
In the first two decades following the enactment of Taft-Hartley, un-
ions enjoyed what one commentator has called a "mantle of respectabil-
ity in the public mind-a mantle that [unions] never before had, and
since ha[ve] lost.' '2 7 Joel Rogers has provided a lucid explanation of how
unions' ability during the two decades following enactment of Taft-
Hartley both to provide for its members and raise productivity permitted
unions to act "as an agent of the general interest ... [possessing] the or-
ganizational resources and social cachet that gave it political clout on
other matters."'28 He explains that in the years following World War II:
[U]nions functioned as the redistributive agent of the working
class. They operated in essentially closed national economies
where the state relied on fiscal and monetary policy to regulate
125. 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
126. See id. at 371. Moreover, during the litigation, the employer informed all striking
employees of an aspect of the trial examiner's opinion favorable to the right of members
to break the strike. See id.
Referring to the cases preserving members' right to resign during strikes, Professor
Abraham concludes that "[a] doctrine of unrestricted resignation rights without residual
obligations might well comport nicely with Justice Douglas's vision of individual freedom,
but it also substantially fortifies the employer's position vis-A-vis all his employees."
Abraham, supra note 109, at 1316.
After 125 pages of analyzing the NLRB's work during the two administrations of Presi-
dent Reagan, Professor Levy concluded that the invocation of individual rights to bar un-
ion strike behavior rules contrasts with its disregard for individual rights when the em-
ployee's interests are at stake. "[R]ationalizations in terms of individual rights [and] free
choice [screen the] moving force [of the Reagan Board decisions which] is to free the em-
ployer from constraint by workers and their organizations." Paul Alan Levy, The Unidi-
mensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 390 (1985).
127. Stone, supra note 6, at 632 (high public esteem of labor unions in the decade fol-
lowing World War II resulted in the public respecting picket lines and the unemployed
reluctant to accept employment as striker replacements).
128. Rogers, supra note 4, at 104.
19981
Catholic University Law Review
the macro-economy. They demanded and got wage and benefit
increases for their members-partially extracted from firms di-
rectly, partly extracted through the state. And, through the al-
chemy of Keynesian economics, they brought benefits to the
broader society. By delivering solid and rising wage floors to
their members, they boosted aggregate demand. This gave
firms markets for sales, and reasons to renew investment. And
that, in turn, increased productivity and lowered the costs of
mass consumption goods, which was good for everyone.129
As the optimism of the postwar period began to erode, things became
"unstuck." The New Deal industrial relations system began "not work-
ing as well as it once did."'3 With recessionary economic conditions of
the late 1950s came a weakening of labor's strike threat, but the accom-
modation with labor seemed to hold."' By the 1970s, foreign competi-
tion, deregulation, competition from the nonunion sector, and the reces-
sions of 1970-71 and 1974-75 began to take their toll on the unionized
sector.32 Union membership levels began to collapse in major indus-
tries.'33 The union premium, the gap between union and nonunion
wages, had begun to increase due to a combination of cost-of-living
(COLA) wage increases in unionized sectors and the decline in nonunion
wage levels due to the "new labor-market entrants, including females,
teenagers, and the baby-boom cohort., 13 4 Unionized firms began to feel
the pinch and could not fully compensate, as they had previously,
through new productivity gains."'
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 38.
132. See id. at 40.
133. See id. (discussing the meat packing and garment industries).
134. Id. at 40-41. In addition, "[t]he union/nonunion wage differential rose from 19
percent in the late 1960s to 30 percent by the late 1970s." Id. at 41.
135. See id. at 70. These forces, joined with "[a] combination of market saturation and
the entrance of new competitors into saturated markets [to] undercut the autonomy of
[the U.S. and other Western] national economies, uprooting the foundations of Keynesian
policy." Rogers, supra note 4, at 107. "[O]nce firms began looking for export markets, it
became difficult to regulate the growth of any economy by stimulating consumer de-
mand." Id. at 108.
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American business responded in different ways. Many firms reacted to
these pressures by reducing costs'36 and pursuing nonunion strategies.'37
All of these responses had the effect of "undercut[ting] the integrity of
workers as a group [and leaving] fewer places for unskilled or semi-
skilled workers in manufacturing."'38 By the late 1970s, a labor policy
stalemate had developed, as evidenced by the inability of a Democratic
Congress and Democratic President to overcome a Senate filibuster that
defeated the labor-law reform bill in 1977.1"9 As the unions' position
weakened, they became the object of attack-from both their enemies
and their friends.
By the 1980s, business opposition to unions intensified. President
Reagan's firing of the Air Traffic Controllers sent a signal that opposing
unions was again a respectable thing to do,'4 0 but, as Thomas Kochan and
his colleagues have demonstrated in their research, "the changes which
occurred in the early 1980s reflect deep-seated environmental pressures
that had been building up gradually as well as organizational strategies
that had been evolving quietly for a number of years.' 4' Changing
events "by the early 1980s had set the stage .. .for an intense debate
concerning the role of unions and collective bargaining in American so-
ciety.''141 Increasingly, the question arose, should collective bargaining
continue to be promoted or should it be supplanted by new forms of em-
ployee participation and representation?
136. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 108 (stating that "[f]irms reacted to these pressures
[either by] cutting costs, primarily wage costs [or by] compet[ing] on quality and product
differentiation rather than price"). A wage cutting strategy depleted work from rich coun-
tries and ultimately was a losing tactic for rich countries since there always was a poorer
country that was better able to provide cheap labor. See id. Plus, the product differentia-
tion strategy was only a partial solution because firms "get stuck in specialty niches" re-
quiring repeated firm-level reorganization and decentralization. Id. at 109; see also Kath-
erine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to
Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 989 (1995) (discussing capital
flight and the "race-to-the bottom" mentality).
137. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 44 (noting that companies began success-
fully pursuing nonunion strategies to escape the union premium).
138. Rogers, supra note 4, at 109. Joel Rogers concludes, "It is hardly surprising that
even the strongest unions are on the defensive, and the weakest ones, .... are facing a
rout." Id. at 110.
139. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 44.
140. See id. at 9 (stating that "[n]ot since the days of the American plan and company
unionism that followed World War I has it been as socially or politically acceptable for
U.S. management to embrace publicly a 'union free' preference as it is today").
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id. at 5-6.
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That debate was set against an environmental background of deep-
seated managerial hostility to trade unionism.'43 Thomas Kochan and his
associates, as well as many others, conclude that employer hostility was a
major contributing factor in the steep and broad decline in union mem-
bership.1"
143. In the 1950s and early 1960s, many in the academic community expressed the
view that American management had come to accept unions as a permanent industrial
relations fixture. See id. at 8 (indicating that "[b]y the 1960s both researchers and practi-
tioners of collective bargaining seemed to believe that relations between labor and man-
agement had matured and stabilized, that management had accommodated to the fact that
collective bargaining was here to stay, and that labor unions were a permanent participant
in their employment relationships"); see also id. at 14; TOMLINS, supra note 2, at xii (re-
porting an address by George W. Brooks of Cornell University in 1961 to the Industrial
Relations Research Association, "[d]rawing to his audience's attention the 'astonishing
degree of unanimity' which characterized contemporary discussions of industrial and labor
relations"). It turned out that this was a misinterpretation. Kochan and his associates
have reported the research by Reinhard Bendix and others on this point. It demonstrates
that managerial ideology toward unions, even during the reapproachment period of the
1950s and early 1960s, remained consistent with the historic hostility of the American
managerial class: unions conflict with values that "stress individual initiative, the centrality
of one's right to defend individual property rights, and the desire to maintain managerial
control and worker discipline." KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 14-15 & n.23 (citing the
work of REINHARD BENDIX, WORK AND AUTHORITY IN INDUSTRY (1956)). Industrial
relations managers tended to view unions positively. See id. at 14. Those who formulated
business strategies and plans maintained an ideology of opposition. See id. They accepted
unions as a "pragmatic or strategic adaptation to the high costs of avoiding or dislodging
established unions." Id. at 14. Managers historically interpreted the choice to unionize as
a "black mark on their professional record. Unionization was... an indication of manage-
rial failure. It was unnatural, illegitimate, and un-American, and to be resisted, within the
law." Id. at 15 & n.24 (citing the work of HOWELL JOHN HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO
MANAGE (1982)).
This deep-seated hostility is sometimes clouded by data showing that management also
supports the "legitimacy or even the desirability of a free labor movement as a part of our
democratic society .... [The] curious inconsistency ... [is] unions are [viewed by man-
agement as] an essential part of the democratic fabric of society, but they are not neces-
sarily desirable or acceptable 'in my firm or on my property."' Id. at 15.
144. The response by management to expand the nonunion sector during the late
1960s and 1970s was both intense and widespread. It has been well documented. See
KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 49-50 (tracing the growth of the nonunion sector).
Over the two decades of the 1960s and 1970s, underground bituminous coal mining grew
from virtually a zero nonunion sector to twenty percent. See id. at 49. In construction,
"open shop" construction began in the 1950s to slowly move into residential construction,
made modest gains in commercial construction in the early 1970s, and between 1975 and
1984, nonunion activity increased from 50 to 75 percent of all construction work. See id.
Since over-the-road trucking deregulation in 1980, one-fifth of the unionized companies
have gone into bankruptcy and have been replaced by nonunion companies. See id. Be-
tween the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, General Electric has gone from 30 to 40 nonunion
plants to twice that many. See id. Other major companies such as Monsanto and 3M have
seen a drop in the unionization rate of their production and maintenance employees from
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This loss in confidence in the collective bargaining system, and in un-
ions as its effectuating force, is thus rooted in economic factors and em-
ployer value systems. Part of unions' loss of esteem also can be found in
the larger anti-Establishment assault on authority that caused a loss of
confidence in institutions generally-schools, universities, government,
corporations, the church, and others.4 ' As James Patterson writes, "[n]o
institutions could shut off the rhetoric of rights that rang throughout the
land" in the late 1960s and 1970s.146 The Red Scare of communist infiltra-
tion in some unions at the height of the Cold War cast a pall' 7 The
McClellan hearings in the Senate, which uncovered corruption in a small
number of unions, were well publicized and helped turn public opinion
against unions. In response, the Senate enacted the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act in 1959 to regulate union fi-
nances and promote democracy within unions. 149
Even some of the unions' friends turned against them during the pe-
riod. The "New Left" saw unions as "stodgy and conservative.'' Even
today, friends of labor on the Left argue that labor lacks the ability to
command public support because "labor repeatedly alienated itself from
the great social and protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s."'1' La-
80 to 40 percent. See id. at 49-50.
Employer hostility was a major contributing factor. The shift in the economy and
changes in occupational distribution have contributed to this, as noted above-accounting
for perhaps forty percent of the total. See id. at 53L54. Plus, some of the loss is attribut-
able to the unions' failure to invest in new organizing. See id. at 55. But the single most
significant factor has been the increased prevalence of union-avoidance values and actions
by management. See id. at 55-62. On the "wrath" that underlies the "increased employer
antipathy and resistance to unions [in the 1970s]," see Abraham, supra note 109, at 1319-
20 & nn.268-78 (detailing the "explosion of unfair labor practice filings,... a vast rise in
union decertification elections, and the mushrooming of the anti-union consulting indus-
try").
145. See PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 713-14, 764 (discussing the anti-authority
movements in the 1960s and early 1970s).
146. Id. at 714.
147. See id. at 54 (discussing the successful efforts of the AFL and the CIO leadership
to rid unions of communist influence). Part of that legacy is the schism doctrine that re-
mains part of our law to this day. See TOMLINS, supra note 2, at 323-24 (writing that the
schism doctrine was developed to "encourage[] the raiding of Communist-led incumbents
by AFL and CIO unions").
148. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 38; Stone, supra note 6, at 632 (indicating
that broad publication of corruption in labor unions chilled public support of the unions).
149. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 38.
150. PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 623.
151. Rogers, supra note 47, at 82 n.222; see also Arnold R. Weber, Keeping Manage-
ment Awake, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1984, at 22 (reviewing RICHARD B. FREEMAN &
JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984)) (stating that "[t]he liberals' ardor has
been dampened by criticisms that unions have been slow to embrace equal opportunity for
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bor's political program has always extended beyond its own selfish inter-
152ests, but unions did not always share the enthusiasm for some of the
Left's more cherished political initiatives. Labor supported civil rights
legislation, but "[1]abor unions were becoming increasingly divided on
issues of race . . ." during the 1960s and 1970s. Unions were staunch
cold warriors and fierce opponents of the movement protesting the war
in Vietnam14 Some unions also have opposed the women's movement
and environmental movement. One commentator concluded that when
one lists the movements unions opposed, "[tihere are not, for the period,
a great many movements left."' 5
No mention of this loss of confidence in collective bargaining in gen-
eral and in unions in particular during the 1960s and 1970s can be found
directly in case law. So it is difficult to assess its contribution to the law's
retreat from protecting employee group power. There is the occasional
yelp from a member of the judiciary protesting the NLRB's hostility to-
ward unions, such as Senior Judge Swygert's conclusion that the NLRB's
"off-hand dismissal" of unions' efforts to have their collective needs bal-
anced against individual section 7 rights "evinces an unseemly hostility
against trade unionism. 1 16 The academic literature certainly makes the
minorities and women in their own house, and have been staunch cold warriors in foreign
affairs").
Professor Stone argues the question from a subtly different perspective. Her point is
not so much that the Left abandoned unions because unions failed to support the social
movements of the period but rather that "[o]ther social causes like the civil rights move-
ment and the anti-war movement captured [their] hearts and minds ...." Stone, supra
note 6, at 632; see also WILLIAM J. PUETTE, THROUGH JAUNDICED EYES: HOW THE
MEDIA VIEW ORGANIZED LABOR 8 (1992) (noting that "[t]he leftwing intellectual ... is
comfortable crusading for the downtrodden and aggrieved worker but is uncomfortable
relating to the working-class union leader and the well-paid union worker"); id. at 12 (dis-
cussing how "the media were glad to take up [labor's] banner" when labor was viewed "as
an underprivileged, generally helpless and disfranchised object of pity" but abandoned
labor "when these same workers' unions were sufficiently organized to begin exerting the
very power the media had formerly advocated"); id. at 24 (indicating that "[t]he primary
social issue dominating American liberalism in the 1960s was the battle for civil rights.
Largely because of the expanding economy, labor issues were not high on media agen-
das").
152. Labor's political program included support for issues beyond the narrow scope of
collective bargaining, such as social security, minimum wage, workplace safety and health,
and national health insurance. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 28.
153. PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 564.
154. It may be recounted that President Nixon appealed to working Americans as the
"forgotten Americans" and the "silent Americans" during the Vietnam war years. Id. at
702.
155. Rogers, supra note 47, at 82 n.222.
156. Local 1384, UAW v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 482, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., dis-
senting).
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connection between the loss of esteem for collective bargaining and un-
ions and the deterioration of legal protection for worker collective
rights.157 Indeed, many argue it is "untenable" to think that the admini-
stration of labor policy by the courts and the NLRB can be divorced
from the social history of the age and uninfluenced by it."' When one
adds that the press generally has subjected unions either to negative cov-
erage or malign neglect,159 the case tightens that union esteem had begun
to unravel from many sides and social policy responded by undermining
protection of worker collective rights.
Some of the most persuasive evidence that a national sentiment less
supportive of collective bargaining has transformed public policy can be
found in the congressional preference, since the 1970s, for statutes pro-
tecting the individual rights, rather than the group rights, of workers1 6
Since the 1960s, the national commitment for "group-based" legislation,
such as the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, seeking to advance
worker interests through the protection of group action,' 6' has given way
to "category-based" legislation ' that "relied on individual rights and
157. See Stone, supra note 6, at 632 (indicating that "[I]abor's demise in the public
mind paralleled the demise of union strength"); see also Abraham, supra note 109, at 1319-
21 (stating that "[p]ublic life in the United States entered a period hostile to labor and its
allies .... Lawyers, jurists, and scholars became part of this new discourse. In general...
the deterioration of organized labor's political and cultural standing proceeded apace with
the decline of its standing in the workplace"); id. at 1298 n.130 (collecting authority).
158. See Abraham, supra note 109, at 1334 (discussing how it is "untenable" to deny
that the Board's mid-1980s decisions are "highly political," "undisguised partisan proj-
ects").
159. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 162-
80, 207 (1984) (stating that "[i]f one's perception of the labor movement came solely from
media portraits, one would believe that crookedness, undemocratic behavior, and strikes
flourish under unionism"); see also Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Two
Faces of Unionism, 57 PUBLIC INTEREST 69, 69-70 (1979) (noting that unions receive in-
creasingly less news coverage and mostly of an unfavorable kind); PUETrE, supra note
151, at 8 (detailing the media's bias in the reporting of labor issues).
160. Indeed, Professor James Brudney has advanced an analysis that makes the proc-
ess symbiotic; the actions of the legislative branch demonstrate a loss of confidence in
collective bargaining as an institution, which in turn causes a "loss of legitimacy for unions
as the enablers of group action. This loss of legitimacy encourages the business commu-
nity and the general public to erode and belittle the role of unions." See Brudney, supra
note 77, at 1563-64. Then public confidence in collective bargaining erodes even more,
permitting the cycle to repeats itself.
161. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonle-
gal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 177-78 (1996) (discussing
group-based rules such as the Wagner Act and other labor relations laws).
162. See id. at 179-80 (discussing category-based rules such as employment discrimina-
tion laws).
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freedoms while virtually ignoring group action." '163 Changes in national
sentiment regarding individual rights combined with the loss of confi-
dence in collective bargaining fueled change. ' 64 While on its face none of
the category-based legislation was inconsistent with a commitment to
group action, it nevertheless undermined group action. Category-based
legislation signaled a conclusion that the collective bargaining process
was unable to address pervasive workplace problems.' The new em-
ployment legislation reduced the need for unions because it created indi-
vidual rights enforced by individuals, 166 and in most of these statutes, un-t. 167
ions play bit parts or are cast as part of the problem. In short, at some
point in the mid-1970s, the equilibrium shifted. Employment relations
were primarily addressed by protecting individual employee rights rather
than through the New Deal collective bargaining system, which was per-
mitted to fall into disrepair because the commitment to the statute's basic
approach waned.168
163. Brudney, supra note 77, at 1568. The category-based legislation is of two types:
legislation protecting equality of treatment and legislation guaranteeing minimum rights.
See id. The former has its source in the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Professor
Katherine Stone situates the latter in the "public climate which was receptive to, if not in-
sistent upon, some protection for the job security of individual employees" following "the
dramatic corporate transformations of the [1980s that] produced correspondingly dramatic
employee dislocations." Stone, supra note 6, at 632-33.
164. Professor Brudney notes that changing economic conditions reduced national
concern for industrial stability, the restoration of mass purchasing power, and the redistri-
bution of national income-all factors that motivated Congress to establish the postwar
collective bargaining regime of Wagner and Taft-Hartley. See Brudney, supra note 77, at
1568. In addition, the collective bargaining regime itself became "part of the problem"
when collective bargaining contracts perpetuated racial discrimination at the workplace.
Congress responded by increased emphasis on category-based statutes protecting individ-
ual worker interests "while virtually ignoring group action." Id.
165. See id. at 1569-70 (stating that "[t]he need for a legislative solution revealed
shortcomings in the collective bargaining approach"); see also Stone, supra note 6, at 591-
93 (summarizing state judicial and legislative changes creating a "renaissance of rights for
individual employees" and concluding that "the emerging regime of individual employee
rights represents not a complement to or an embellishment of the regime of collective
rights, but rather its replacement").
166. See Brudney, supra note 77, at 1570 (noting that "[e]mployees were now able to
pursue their own rights at little or no financial cost, just as they had relied on unions to
pursue their contractual and statutory rights in the past").
167. See id. at 1571-72. As Professor Brudney observes, under group-based legislation,
unions play the lead role in negotiating improved working conditions for employees, but
under category-based legislation, "the individual rights regime assigns unions cameo ap-
pearances or even casts them as villains impeding employees' economic progress"-obsta-
cles to the realization of individual rights. Id. at 1571.
168. See id.. Relying on empirical analysis, Professor Brudney has concluded that judi-
cial opinions similarly have reflected a marked decrease in support of group action as
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David Abraham has noted this shift, concluding that as labor's strug-
gles increasingly seem unglamourous and routine, as American trade
unions seem increasingly impotent, and as "public disenchantment with
their roles" has increased, there has developed a "weakening of the pub-
lic's appreciation of collective action."'6 9 Katherine Stone's research in
recent years demonstrates that the legal framework regulating labor rela-
tions has shifted from one of federal statutory empowerment of groups
to one of promotion of individual employment rights by state courts and
legislatures.' 70 Stone's work takes the prior scholarship a step beyond,
however, by showing that not only has the loss of commitment to collec-
tive bargaining resulted in "a series of judicial and administrative deci-
sions [undermining] collective rights [of] workers,' 7 but relatively recent
state law protecting individuals at the workplace excludes unionized em-
ployees by operation of the preemption principle embedded in section
172301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has warned that the combination of adding more state em-
ployment laws and denying their protection to unionized employees
through operation of the section 301 preemption principle could be det-
rimental to the collective bargaining process.7 3 Plus, the section 301 pre-
measured by the rate of union success before the Supreme Court and the courts of ap-
peals. See id. at 1572-80 (discussing the Supreme Court's shift away from group action
support); id. at 1581-88 (discussing the courts of appeals' cynicism concerning group ac-
tion).
169. Abraham, supra note 109, at 1283. Mark Barenberg has argued that public confi-
dence in collective empowerment of workers was eroded by two cultural miscalculations.
First, labor policy underestimated the "deep-seated resistance toward unions ... embed-
ded in the belief system of U.S. managers." Barenberg, supra note 90, at 1495. Second,
labor policy failed to appreciate the fear of American business that legitimizing collective
bargaining "risked opening a cultural Pandora's Box. Workers' appetite for decision-
making authority, organizational democracy, and redistributive power would grow with
the eating." Id. These miscalculations registered in the failure of the New Deal labor rela-
tions system "as amended and actually administered" to engender a "cooperationist ac-
ceptance and trust in collective bargaining." Id. at 1494.
170. See Stone, supra note 6, at 575.
171. Id. at 575 n.3 (collecting authority).
172. See id. at 577 (concluding that "there is a tension between the new individual em-
ployment rights and the New Deal system of collective bargaining, a tension that means,
concretely, that organized workers do not share in the benefits of the new employment
rights". "A survey of recent preemption cases reveals a very broad tendency for courts to
preempt unionized workers' state law claims. Indeed, with very few exceptions, courts
always preempt unionized workers' attempts to assert state law employment rights." Id. at
606.
173. See Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140, 1150 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski J., dis-
senting) (noting the risk that an employer could argue against an effort to unionize by
pointing out to employees their loss of state employment rights if they unionize), rev'd,
512 U.S. 107 (1994). "[E]mployers frequently inform their employees during organizing
drives that they will lose various state law rights if they form a union. Under existing pre-
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emption of state employment law rights for unionized employees means
that now "collectively bargained rights are not always better.'
174
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND EVALUATIONS OF THE TREND AWAY FROM
PROTECTING GROUP RIGHTS
The burden of my argument in this Article has been first, that the leg-
islative history of section 8(b)(1)(A) supports a far more limited role for
the section than the one given it by the NLRB in its union discipline
cases; second, if one compares NLRB and judicial precedent during the
first twenty years with the next thirty years following the enactment of
Taft-Hartley, one finds a dramatic change in the scope of state control
over union discipline; third, that these cases substantially disarm worker
majorities in their struggles with employers; and lastly, that the section
8(b)(1)(A) union discipline cases begin to make better sense when situ-
ated within the fluctuations of a postwar legal, economic, and political
culture struggling to adjust.
Of the many forces that no doubt converged to reconceive section
8(b)(1)(A) during the postwar period, the institutional interests of the
NLRB itself cannot be dismissed. Postwar labor litigation is filled with
examples of the Supreme Court's efforts to suppress the Board's appetite
for adding limits to unions' economic weapons beyond those Congress
placed explicitly in the statute. The Board's union discipline cases are so
congruent with these failed attempts that it is reasonable to conclude that
some, but not all, of the explanation for the Board's immoderation in
these cases is attributable to its desire to advance its vision of labor pol-
icy by limiting worker self-help options. Perhaps in the process the
Board also enhances its own power and prestige.
In addition, this Article argues that the union discipline cases represent
an NLRB response to the inexorable forces favoring individual rights
and entitlements. The increased use by unions in the 1960s to enforce its
fines judicially explains some of the government's insistence that it over-
see the reasons for the fines it was asked to enforce. Additionally, en-
hanced notions of rights consciousness weakened labor law's ability to
continue the blur between individual and group consent, upon which so
much of the Wagner Act had been built. Taft-Hartley thus created new
zones of individual rights against the group but also embraced a new
philosophical stance with respect to the relationship of the individual to
the group. Therefore, the union discipline cases can also be understood
as the Board's application of Taft-Hartley's philosophical change in a
emption rules, these claims are true." Stone, supra note 6, at 643.
174. Stone, supra note 6, at 631.
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dynamic culture that increasingly insisted on more individual rights and
less trust in groups.
But the Board's union discipline cases are a product of their age in yet
another way because they also mirror a diminished societal commitment
to collective bargaining as an institution. There has been a loss of public
confidence in collective bargaining for a variety of reasons-some eco-
nomic, some historical, some political. The commitment to collective ac-
tion through group-based litigation as the preferred method to protect
workers' rights in the workplace and insure political and industrial sta-
bility has given way to what we now call employment law-law protect-
ing the individual rather than group rights in the workplace. We now can
see much more clearly that the conventional wisdom that Taft-Hartley
merely nibbled at the edges of labor policy but maintained its core may
be an oversimplification. The core commitment to collective bargaining
may not have been overtly repealed but the commitment of the courts,
the NLRB, and Congress to the process has waned. The union discipline
cases are consistent with this decreased commitment to collective
empowerment of workers, this loss of esteem for collective bargaining as
an institution, and a new view that workers' interests should be protected
through statutes protecting them as individuals more than as members of
groups.
In 1948, Congressman Fred A. Hartley wrote that he was "confident
that history will record the Taft-Hartley Act as a great step forward in
labor relations law."'75 If Congressman Hartley was referring to Taft-
Hartley being the first installment of a reduced public commitment to
worker collective empowerment, then he framed the issue that must be
confronted today: Is the shift away from the collective empowerment of
workers through group-based legislation in favor of empowerment of in-
dividuals through category-based legislation "a great step forward in la-
bor relations law?"
There are practical, moral, and political reasons why the interests of
American workers are poorly served by any policy emphasizing individ-
ual rights legislation over group-based legislation.'76 The American busi-
175. HARTLEY, supra note **, at 138.
176. Some surely take the view that the interests of American workers are best served
by a substitution of individual rights legislation for group-based legislation. See Charles
Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State
of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1040 (1984) (arguing the need to
move "toward direct imposition of specific minimal terms and standards where problems
in the workplace have been perceived [and] away from governmentally sheltered monop-
oly status for labor unions"). Some of the category-based legislation suggested by Profes-
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ness community itself has an enormous stake in maintaining an emphasis
on group-based protections of workers' interests. First, a one-size-fits-all
approach to solving workplace problems is too inflexible to meet the di-
verse needs of firms and the preferences of their employees. The private
ordering that is the foundation of collective bargaining remains an ele-
gant solution to the curse of suffocating statism. 17  Collective bargaining
is designed to permit the parties to adjust to "local differences., 171 With-
out a robust unionized sector in the economy, American business and its• 171
workers can expect more, not less, governmental regulation.
sor Fried includes: unemployment insurance, workplace safety and health statutes, anti-
employment discrimination legislation, and protections against unjust dismissal. See id. at
1036-37; see also WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 3 (1991) (encouraging modern unions to model after late-nineteenth
century unions that "embraced broad and radical reform ambitions"). More often, politi-
cal moderates recommend that public policy expand minimum standard legislation and
combine that expansion with legislation to encourage strong trade unionism. See Posner,
supra note 161, at 180 n.135 (citing a variety of suggestions).
Others advocate such suggestions as work councils or representation on corporate
boards of directors. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE
FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 152-61, 186-224 (1990) (describing various
ideas for workplace governance and worker participation); Craver, supra note 4, at 1643
(suggesting "shop-level works councils and the election of employee representatives to
corporate boards," and an infusion of new federal protective labor legislation); Stone, su-
pra note 6, at 585 n.29 (citing authority). Understandably, some who believe they have
been accused of suggesting a complete dependance on category-based legislation have de-
nied vigorously the suggestion. See, Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Future of Collective
Bargaining: A Review Essay, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 483-84 & nn.26-27 (1989) (reviewing
LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE-THEORETICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (Samual Estreicher & Daniel Collins eds., 1988)) (denying emphatically
that Stone or anyone else associated with the Critical Legal Studies school have urged that
the current system be replaced entirely with category-based legislation but rather all have
continued their commitment to union representation).
177. See Barenberg, supra note 90, at 1417 (discussing the role of collective bargaining
as a counterweight to "state socialism").
178. Stone, supra note 6, at 637. Paul Weiler, for example, has argued that collective
bargaining is the preferred method for handling employment discipline issues because
collectively bargained rights to protect from unjust dismissal "will be more comprehensive
and effective than anything management might be induced to offer by the pressures of an
individualist labor market, and more flexible and sensitive than anything a government
could hope to provide through a judicial or administrative bureaucracy." WEILER, supra
note 176, at 93-94.
By further example, one need only contemplate the vastness of the task of setting stan-
dards for all hazardous industrial substances in the United States, and the difficulties that
the Labor Department and the National Institute of Safety and Health have confronted in
the attempt, to appreciate how ineffective national standards-setting legislation can be.
See Stone, supra note 6, at 637-38. Depending on the plant, an OSHA standard may be
too strict or too lax, and the employer and the union can bring extensive expertise to bear
on the problem to frame a standard that fits. See Posner, supra note 161, at 179-80.
179. See Posner, supra note 161, at 193 (stating that "[s]olildarity groups supply collec-
tive goods that people otherwise demand from the state. Through policies of selective
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Second, business has a stake in vibrant trade unionism because it is en-
titled to the productivity gains that trade unionism brings. Richard
Freeman and James Medoff have assembled much of the vast research
demonstrating that an increased employee role in workplace decision
making increases responsibility and commitment to the firm and also
productivity."' Yet, these new cooperative work arrangements too often
degenerate and create "distrust, cynicism, and low morale..'.'. Unions
help sustain employee trust that systems of workplace collaboration have
and maintain integrity.
One cannot become too sanguine that the above evidence concluding
that trade unionism is good for the American economy will likely break
the stalemate over labor law reform. Those within the business commu-
nity who may know intellectually that unions are good for the economy,
also know unions erode profit levels by forcing income transfers from
corporate executives and investors to workers.'82 Add to this the historic
hostility of American management to unions and it seems unlikely that
the business community will work to strengthen group rights of workers
even if unions enhance overall economic efficiency.
However, workers themselves and the public at large have other im-
portant interests at stake. First, individual rights-based legislation risks
giving American workers a false sense of security. 83 A policy depending
on state and local legislation simply creates an incentive not to protect
workers, because all too often less employee protection is an effective
support, the state can effect increases in the supply of these goods more cheaply than it
could supply them itself through direct or category-based regulation.").
180. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 159. For then, the work environment be-
comes trust-inducing. With trust, workers are encouraged to put aside short-term desires
and invest in their own and their firm's long-term interests. See Barenberg, supra note 90,
at 1493-94 & nn.482-86 (collecting authority).
181. Stone, supra note 6, at 637.
182. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 159, at 22. Freeman and Medoff noted:
Unionized employers tend to earn a lower rate of return per dollar of capital
than do nonunion employers ... because the increase in wages and the greater
amount of capital used per worker are not compensated for by the higher pro-
ductivity of labor associated with unionism. The reduction in profitability ... is
centered in highly concentrated and otherwise historically highly profitable sec-
tors of the economy.
Id.; see also David Montgomery, Labor Pains, WASH. POST, July 22, 1984, at 5 (reviewing
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984)) (stating that
"[i]n general, Freeman and Medoff conclude that unions are advantageous 'to organized
workers, almost always; beneficial to the economy, in many ways (including promoting
efficiency); but hard on the bottom line of company balance sheets.' Unions face intense
resistance because they hurt profits").
183. See Susan L. Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment at
Will Rule, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 471,471-72 (1983).
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strategy for attracting new business investment into a community. Fed-
eralizing individual rights labor legislation provides no greater long-term
protection. The outright hostility to labor and civil rights legislation by
the federal judiciary in our own time is a matter of record. The infamous
1989 Term of the United States Supreme Court is but the most notorious
example."4 Congress was required to remedy the harm done that Term,
which it did, but only in part, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 81 Professor
Brudney's research demonstrates that "[j]udicial efforts to retreat from
[protection of group rights] seem to reflect less disagreement over what
Congress meant than discomfort over the wisdom of adhering to what
Congress is known to have meant." '186 The union discipline cases that
have been the focus of this essay substantiate that disagreement with
what Congress is known to have meant is strong medicine in day-to-day
enforcement of labor legislation. The research by many others cited in
this essay, as well as periodic outcries from members of the judiciary,
corroborate the risk of periodic administrative and judicial hostility
workers suffer.187
All of this illuminates a fundamental practical problem resulting from
184. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the
coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1870); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989) (interpreting Title VII limitations period to make recovery more difficult); Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that white employees who were not parties to con-
sent decrees have had their interests harmed); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) (limiting the "disparate-impact" theory of recovery under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil rights Act); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (changing
burden of proof, making recovery under civil rights statutes more difficult).
185. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981). But many of those gains were eroded by subsequent judicial interpretation. See
Hollander, supra note 3, at 443 (stating that "early indications with respect to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 ... indicate that the conservative federal judges ... will continue to
disembowel any progressive legislation").
186. Brudney, supra note 77, at 1591.
187. Even when protective labor legislation has not been judicially eroded or repealed
legislatively, it denies American workers the protections they need. Lawsuits are im-
mensely more complex and expensive than grievances and often provide inadequate
remedies. Susan Catler's research shows that most wrongful discharge cases, for example,
are brought by highly paid professional employees who can finance the litigation and that
the reinstatement remedies most wrongful discharges. See Catler, supra note 183, at 496-
97.
On the recent development of undermining the protection of individual employment
rights through the use of arbitration to resolve statutory disputes, see Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1996) (noting that a trend requir-
ing arbitration of workers' statutory claims "threatens to turn back the clock on workers'
rights").
[Vol. 47:825
Collective Empowerment and the Public Good
de-emphasizing group-based legislation. Without it, workers lack the
political clout needed to obtain and sustain meaningful protective labor
legislation and protect against the risk that legislative gains will prove
vulnerable and transitory. Yet the subliminal cultural message of indi-
vidual rights legislation is workers should not, or at least need not, com-
bine to protect their legitimate interests. The message is that collective
bargaining is insufficient to provide workers the protections to which
they are entitled, and workers do not need collective bargaining because
workers can depend on government to provide and sustain adequate in-
dividual rights legislation to protect them.
Katherine Stone has observed that a public policy protecting worker
interests through protective labor legislation, rather than through group-
based legislation that enhances collective worker empowerment, "con-
tains a built-in self-destruct dynamic. It functions to disorganize labor, to
prevent the very group-formation that is necessary to retain or improve
the minimal terms.""" For all persons of goodwill who care about work-
ers' rights, this is a chilling observation.
Finally, to these practical reasons for not substituting minimum stan-
dards legislation for legislation protecting group rights must be added the
moral deficiency in any labor law system lacking adequate legal protec-
tion of group empowerment at the workplace. At the center of Senator
Wagner's ideological firmament was "an integrationist and cooperation-
ist vision of class relations" where "achieving workers' democratic con-
sent and substantive freedom through collective empowerment" took
precedence over all other legislative goals."8 9 To Senator Wagner, union
representation was not only an economic and political good but also a
"moral imperative. '" And so today, even if workers could achieve dis-
tributive justice through individual rights legislation, without group
power there can be no genuine consent to workplace authority rela-
tions.' 9' To Senator Wagner it was clear that workplace tranquility
188. Stone, supra note 6, at 638; see also Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Un-
ions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 300-02 (1995) (discussing the
role of unions as voluntary organizations transforming private issues of workers into pub-
lic issues and legislative action thereby invigorating the democratic process); Rogers, supra
note 4, at 98 (noting that "the basic political idea [of the Wagner Act] was that, inside the
firm and out, worker organization would help American democracy by providing a 'coun-
tervailing power' to otherwise overwhelming business domination.").
189. Barenberg, supra note 90, at 1390 n.31, 1400.
190. Rogers, supra note 4, at 98.
191. Wagner believed that "only collective bargaining could legitimately elicit the ac-
quiescence of workers, at least in the mass production industries." Barenberg, supra note
90, at 1402 n.88.
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
through duress is no more moral than the tranquility of the slave system
in the Old South.1'9 Each lacks democratic consent in the achievement of
industrial peace. Shall the employer-employee relationship remain what
the common law called it-a master-servant relationship? Collective
bargaining reduces the power disparity on which the work relationship
necessarily is based in an economy such as ours and the disparity that
remains is legitimate in the sense it is cleansed of much of its duress.
That always has been, and remains, the moral claim of collective bar-
gaining.
One commentator has asked, "how might [labor law] reform be seen as
in the general interest of American society," as "a paladin of the general
will?" '193 Ironically, the union discipline cases at least in part offer a clue.
If it is true that group rights were sacrificed in the union discipline cases
because of a loss of commitment to the collective bargaining process as
an institution and because of a perceived need to enhance the individual
rights of workers, then these two considerations need to be the starting
point of any design to reinvigorate group rights of workers. Collective
bargaining must regain its mantle of respect and importance. And the
national appetite for freedom without responsibility must be discussed
openly. Senator Wagner's vision of the "moral imperative" of group
empowerment is thus an inviting invitation to refocus the debate about
labor law reform. Making collective bargaining the "cooperative venture
guided by intelligence, rather than a mere test of relative strength,"
1 94
that Senator Wagner envisioned will always be a challenge but remains a
viable goal. Plus, collective bargaining remains the best means through
which workers render democratic consent to authority through their par-
ticipation in the conditions of employment under which they work. The
alternative is unacceptable. It has workers submitting but not consent-
ing. There is no moral integrity to such an approach, even if the legisla-
ture sedates the process with additional layers of category-based work-
place statutes that provide workers minimum rights. Charles Craver has
framed the issue as well as anyone. He has stated that "Americans must
decide whether we believe that independent labor organizations are an
important aspect of a democratic society. If we do not act quickly to re-
verse the long-standing union decline, labor entities may become irrele-
vant by the end of the decade."' 95
192. See id. at 1423.
193. Rogers, supra note 4, at 101,123.
194. Barenberg, supra note 90, at 1420.
195. Craver, supra note 4, at 1642.
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In an article in the sports section of the Washington Post, Michael Wil-
bon wrote of baseball's "[f]atal [d]etraction. ' '196 He wrote that the sport's
shortcomings had caused a changed national sentiment that threatened
to make baseball like the train: "Sure once in a while when you want
something slow and lazy that will harken you back to a simpler time
you'll settle in for a nice, long train ride. But for the most part, its a mu-
seum piece. Something we'll explain to our children, who probably
won't care to listen."' '9 Predicting the end to baseball is a cottage indus-
try that has been around a long time. So also is the industry of predicting
the demise of the trade union movement. That said, we all know that
there used to be many more passenger trains in this country than there
are today. Cultural icons do die, except of course the Rolling Stones,
who are still packing them in night after night even though their last hit
was Brown Sugar in March of 1971.
It is my view that the only hope for keeping collective bargaining off
the museum shelves and protecting it from the malaise in which it finds
itself is to focus on what the world of work will be like if we do not have
collective bargaining available to workers who want it. The union disci-
pline cases help us understand the forces that threaten the collective
empowerment of workers upon which collective bargaining depends.
They also stand as beacons to unions showing the competing interests to
which they must be sensitive. The time to refocus the debate to address
the normative underpinnings at stake is now.
196. Michael Wilbon, Baseball's Fatal Detraction, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1997, at C1.
197. Id.
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APPENDIX A
A. Summary of the Legislative History of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
By 1947, the Congress was resolutely committed to the elimination of
closed-shop agreements. Individual freedom unduly suffered, it was ar-
gued, when unions' unbridled power to grant or withhold membership
determined whether one obtained and maintained employment. Un-
linking control over membership from control over employment oppor-
tunities was deemed essential. Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were enacted
to eradicate the closed shop. They banned what was referred to as "ex-
ternal enforcement" of union rules by "preventing the union from in-
ducing the employer to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the
union's rules., 198 Thus entered into our national labor policy the ideol-
ogy of voluntary membership: (1) one may not be compelled into actual
union membership for the membership obligation is reduced to its "fi-
nancial core;" and (2) noncompliance with union rules may have no ef-
fect on one's employment opportunities.'99
Congress did not intend to probe into the internal enforcement of un-
ion rules through methods not requiring employer complicity. The Sen-
ate report discussing section 8(b)(2) disclaimed any intent "to limit the
labor organization with respect to either its selection of membership or
expulsion therefrom."2°° Individual senators made the same representa-
tions on the floor of the Senate. For example, Senator Taft, in response
to Senator Pepper's concern that unions would be helpless to protect
themselves from those who betray the objectives of the union, repre-
sented to the Senate that:
The pending measure does not propose any limitation with
respect to the internal affairs of unions .... All that [unions] will
not be able to do, after the enactment of this bill, is this: If they
fire [expel] a member for some reason other than nonpayment
of dues they cannot make his employer discharge him from his
198. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423,429 (1969).
199. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1985) (discussing how
"mounting objections to closed shop" agreements prompted Congress to enact section
8(a)(3) prohibiting discharge for "failing to abide by union rules or policies with which
[member] disagrees").
200. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 20 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 426 (1948) [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 80-105].
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job and throw him out of work."'
Section 8(b)(1)(A) did not appear in the bill reported to the Senate by
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. It was added as a
floor amendment to the Committee bill by five members of the Senate
Labor Committee, including Senators Taft and Ball.2 2 The Court in
Allis-Chalmers stated that:
What legislative materials there are dealing with [section]
8(b)(1)(A) contain not a single word referring to the applica-
tion of its prohibitions to traditional internal union discipline in
general, or disciplinary fines in particular. On the contrary
there are a number of assurances by its sponsors that the sec-
tion was not meant to regulate the internal affairs of unions.203
This is not surprising because those who sought the addition of section
8(b)(1)(A) "believed that the Senate bill did not go far enough in the
regulation of practices employed by unions for organizational pur-
poses. ' 04 In other words, section 8(b)(1)(A) was offered as a floor
amendment to regulate union organizing tactics.
The report of supplemental views, which announced the intention by
the five members of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
to propose amendments to the Committee bill, listed the abuses their
proposed amendments were designed to address. 25 They proposed the
language of what is now section 8(b)(1)(A) to curb "union coercion of
employees ... and their families in the course of organizing campaigns"
and "direct interference [with employee free choice during organizing
campaigns] by mass picketing and other violence., 201 "Similar expres-
sions pervaded the Senate debates on the amendment. The note repeat-
edly sounded [was] the necessity for protecting individual workers from




201. 93 CONG. REC. S4193 (daily ed. Apr. 29,1947) (statement by Sen. Taft).
202. See NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 285 (1960).
203. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,185-86 (1967).
204. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. at 285.
205. See Marcoux, supra note 11, at 1411-12 n.il.
206. S. REP. No. 80-105, supra note 200, at 50; see also Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S.
at 186 (noting that "[tihe mischief against which the Statement [of supplemental views]
inveighed was restraint and coercion by unions in organizational campaigns"); accord
Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. at 285.
207. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. at 286; see also id. at 285-89 (providing a myriad of
citations indicating that the focus of the Senate's concern was union coercion of unorgan-
ized workers who refused to join the union); accord Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S. at 187
(stating that "the consistent thrust of [Senator Ball's] arguments was the necessity of con-
trolling union conduct in organizational campaigns").
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The approach of the House was in sharp contrast to that of the Senate.
The House "strictly circumscribed" union picketing by "imposing drastic
limitations upon the right to picket. But the House conferees abandoned
the House bill in conference and accepted the Senate proposal.""2 '
The open-textured language comprising the proposed section
8(b)(1)(A) caused some in the Senate to seek assurances that the section
would be cabined as promised and would not be used to regulate union
internal affairs. These assurances were given repeatedly by the sponsors
and others.2' The authoritative legislative history of section 8(b)(1)(A)
thus consists primarily of these floor explanations and clarifications of
the reach of the proposal by the sponsors of the amendment. During a
period of several days, the sponsors repeatedly assured the Senate that
"the section was not meant to regulate internal affairs of unions."'210 Un-
convinced, Senator Pepper from Florida insisted on the addition of the
section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso, to which the sponsors readily consented. As
one sponsor, Senator Ball, stated, "I merely wish to state to the Senate
that the amendment offered by the Senator from Florida is perfectly
agreeable to me. It was never the intention of the sponsors of the pend-
ing amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of
unions."2" Later that day, Senator Ball again reassured the Senate
"[t]hat modification [the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A)] is designed to
make it clear that we are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs
of a union which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is the
coercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize."
212
In one colloquy, Senator Taft suggested that the Senate bill reached
beyond coercive organizational tactics to protect union members from
arbitrary acts of union leaders.23 This single exception from Senator Taft
to the otherwise consistent legislative record by the sponsors of section
8(b)(1)(A) that it was not intended to reach union internal affairs has led
208. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. at 288-89. But see Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB,
473 U.S. 95, 111 (1985) (indicating that Congress was "aware that the broad language of
[section] 8(b)(1)(A) would reach some of the same union conduct proscribed by the"
House bill).
209. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S. at 186.
210. Id. at 186.
211. 93 CONG. REC. S4272 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1947) (statement by Sen. Ball).
212. Id. at S4433.
213. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S. at 194-95 (stating that "the only indication in
the debates over [section] 8(b)(1)(A) of a reach beyond organizational tactics which re-
strain or coerce nonmembers was Senator Taft's concern with arbitrary and undemocratic
union leadership"); cf id. at 209-13 (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing references in legisla-
tive history to section 8(b)(1)(A) reaching internal union affairs).
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the Supreme Court to conclude that "any inference that Senator Taft en-
visioned that [section] 8(b)(1)(A) intruded into and regulated internal
union affairs is negated by his categorical statements to the contrary in
the contemporaneous debates on [section] 8(b)(2). '214
APPENDIX B
A. The Contemporary Reading of Section 8(b)(1)(A) Regulation of
Union Discipline
With some notable exceptions, the means a union uses to enforce in-
ternal union rules and policies against members are irrelevant."' The
end sought to be achieved by the discipline normally is determinative. 16
The current rule can be summarized as follows: 2 7 A union may not im-
pose any discipline by means of expulsion, or by any other coercive
means, if the discipline contravenes an overriding policy in the Taft-
Hartley Ac218 or any other federal labor statute.21 9 This approach has
permitted the NLRB to ban union discipline intended to achieve a wide
array of union objectives that fall into four broad groupings:
Rules designed to bind union members to maintenance of member-
ship commitments made when joining the union or made among members
pursuant to strike decisions.
* A union may not enforce its rules against one who has validly
resigned from the union prior to having engaged in the conduct
that is the basis for the discipline even if membership is granted
on the condition that the member agrees to be bound to union
214. Id. at 189-90.
215. See Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 846-47 (1966) (stating that "[w]e
are unable to conclude that a reasonable reading of the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A)
permits a valid distinction to be drawn between fines and expulsions .... [F]ines and ex-
pulsions are to receive equal treatment under the [Act]"), enforced, NLRB v. Cannery
Workers, 396 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1968).
216. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969) (discussing union discipline law-
fulness measured by whether it contravenes overriding labor policies).
217. See generally Roger C. Hartley, National Labor Relations Board Control of Union
Discipline and the Myth of Nonintervention, 16 VT. L. REV. 11 (1991) (discussing the cur-
rent rule regarding the regulation of union discipline).
218. See Scofield, 394 U.S. at 429.
219. Carpenters Local Union No. 22 (Grazziano Constr. Co.), 195 N.L.R.B. 1 (1972)
(finding that a union fine for opposing an incumbent in an internal union election violated
the Act because it fustrated the labor policies found in the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act); id. at 2 (discussing how "the Board is charged with considering the
full panoply of congressional labor policies in determining the legality of a union fine").
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rules following resignation;"O
9 A union may not impose any restriction on the right to resign
and attempt to impose discipline on one who has resigned in
violation of that restriction even if the union majority votes to
limit the right to resign concurrent with a vote to strike.2
Rules designed to regulate behavior of members harming group ef-
forts to assert economic pressure on employers during times of labor
struggle.
e Unions may enforce, by fines or expulsion, rules forbidding
members from:
-Engaging in strikebreaking-crossing lawful picket lines
or advocating civil disobedience to the union majority's de-
cision to strike;
222
-Exceeding production quotas set by the membership;223 or
-Refusing to support an organizing campaign; 224
9 Unions may not enforce, either by fines or expulsion, rules
prohibiting members from:
-Engaging in strikebreaking-crossing picket lines that
themselves violate some provision of the Act;
22
1
220. See Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1973)
(holding that lawful resignation terminates a union's right to discipline); NLRB v. Granite
State Joint Bd. Textile Workers Union, 409 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1972) (rejecting an argument
that by participating in a strike vote, a member waives his right to resign and engage in
strikebreaking); see also Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430 (holding that union fines against mem-
bers are lawful only if they are "free to leave the union and escape the rule").
221. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 104 (1985).
[A] union commits an unfair labor practice when it enforces a worker's promise
to his fellow workers not to resign from his union and return to work during a
strike, even though the worker freely made the decision to join the union and
freely made the promise not to resign at such a time, and even though union
members democratically made the decision to strike in full awareness of that
promise.
Id. at 117 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
223. See Scofield, 394 U.S. at 425,436.
224. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 593, 237 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160 (1978).
225. Discipline for crossing a picket line violates section 8(b)(4)(B). Compare Local
388, United Ass'n of Journeymen, 280 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1986) (finding that discipline for
crossing unlawful picket line to work for neutral was unlawful), with NLRB v. Local No.
18, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 503 F.2d 780, 783 (6th Cir. 1974) (disagreeing with the
NLRB and concluding that discipline for crossing unlawful picket line to work for primary
was lawful). Discipline for crossing a picket line that violates section 8(b)(7) is unlawful.
See Local 520, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 298 N.L.R.B. 768, 772-773 (1990) (finding
unlawful discipline for crossing picket line violative of section 8(b)(7)(C)).
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-Engaging in strikebreaking-crossing picket lines that are
not unlawful but the NLRB deems contravene some over-
riding policy in the labor laws"226
-Performing mandatory overtime work in contravention of
a union rule promulgated by the membership majority in
an effort to gain leverage during collective bargaining ne-
gotiations.227
Rules regulating behavior harming co-workers individually by be-
traying them to employers:
* Unions may enforce rules
-against voluntarily informing employers of misconduct by
co-workers;228 or
-against giving perjured testimony against a co-worker;2 9
* Unions may not discipline for
-Giving testimony adverse to another worker at an arbitra-
tion hearing or administrative proceeding;230 or
-Signing a witness statement as requested by employer with
knowledge that the statement will be used to discharge a
co-worker and used in a subsequent arbitration.
Behavior undermining union efforts to resolve disputes internally
without the aid of the state:
* Unions may not enforce rules prohibiting union officers from
226. See United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1780, 296 N.L.R.B. 412, 418 (1989) (finding
that the imposition of a fine or any other discipline of a member for refusing to participate
in sympathy strike that the NLRB finds violative of the no-strike clause was unlawful);
Local 12419, Int'l Union of Dist. 50, 176 N.L.R.B. 628, 633 (1969) (discussing how union
interests must be considered but the union has no legitimate interest in discipline for re-
fusing to breach a no-strike clause).
227. NLRB v. GAIU Local 13-B, 682 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1982); see also United Paper-
workers Int'l Union Local No. 5, 294 N.L.R.B. 1168, 1172 (1989) (finding that disciplining
workers for performing mandatory non-unit work was unlawful).
228. See Local 5795, Communications Workers, 192 N.L.R.B. 556, 556-57 (1971)
(finding that a fine for informing the employer of co-employee infractions was lawful); ac-
cord Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1225, 285 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1987).
229. See Graphic Communications Int'l Union Local 388M, 300 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1073
(1990) (holding that discipline for giving perjured testimony at an arbitration hearing was
unlawful when perjury was determined by forum other than internal union procedures).
230. See UMW Local 1058, 299 N.L.R.B. 389 (1990), enforcement denied, NLRB v.
Local Union 1058, UMW, 957 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1992).
231. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 269 N.L.R.B. 129, 131 (1984) (dis-
ciplining workers deemed harmful to the arbitration process); see also Local Lodge D-357,
Cement Workers, 288 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1157 (1988) (finding it unlawful to reprimand an
employee for signing witness statement).
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filing unfair labor practices charges insubordinately-contrary
to instructions from superiors;232 or
e Prohibiting members from filing unfair labor practice charges
against the union without first exhausting internal union appeal
procedures.233
Though the means used to enforce union rules and policies normally
are irrelevant, they do become material in certain circumstances. First,
unions may not attempt to enforce any internal rules, irrespective of the
legitimacy of the end sought, by enlisting the assistance of employers. In
other words, a union may not seek to have an employer adversely affect
one's employment opportunities as a means of enforcing internal union
rules.3 Second, in three situations Board precedent does make a distinc-
tion between discipline affecting membership status and discipline re-
sulting in judicially enforced fines-filing decertification petitions, 23 fil-
ing deauthorization petitions,236 and engaging in dual unionism-
supporting a rival union.237
232. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 181 N.L.R.B. 773, 776 (1970) (finding that the
removal of an elected job steward from his position because he filed unfair labor practice
charges against his employer, contrary to union policy prohibiting filing such charges, was
unlawful).
233. See NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418,
418-19 (1968).
234. See Laborers Int'l Union Local 282, 271 N.L.R.B. 878, 883 (1984) (finding that
discharge because the employee supported incumbent's political opponent was unlawful).
235. Compare International Molders' & Allied Workers Union Local 125, 178
N.L.R.B. 208 (1969) (holding that a fine for filing decertification petition was unlawful),
with United Steelworkers Local 4028, 154 N.L.R.B. 692, 695-96 (1965) (concluding that a
penalty for filing a decertification petition was lawful), enforced sub nom., Price v. NLRB,
373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding suspension lawful) and Tawas Tube Products, Inc,
151 N.L.R.B. 46, 49 (1965) (finding expulsion lawful).
236. See Tool & Die Makers Lodge 113, 207 N.L.R.B. 795, 797 (1973) (finding the fine
unlawful and disqualification from holding office lawful).
237. See Machine Stone Workers Local 89, 265 N.L.R.B. 496, 499 (1982) (determining
the fine unlawful and expulsion lawful); Printing Specialties & Paper Products' Union No.
481, 183 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1274 (1970) (finding fine unlawful and disqualification from office
lawful); see also Buffalo Newspaper Guild, Local 26, 265 N.L.R.B. 382 (1982) (union disci-
pline for filing unit clarification petitions unlawful; unit clarification petitions more akin to
unfair labor practice charges than representation petitions). But see Sheet Metal Workers'
Local Union No. 22, 296 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1148 (1989) (upholding union fining member for
dual unionism).
[Vol. 47:825
